DERIVATIVES AND RISK FRAMEWORK by KINI, RAVICHANDRA VASANT
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
LLM Theses and Essays Student Works and Organizations
1-1-1999
DERIVATIVES AND RISK FRAMEWORK
RAVICHANDRA VASANT KINI
University of Georgia School of Law
DERIVATIVES AND RISK FRAMEWORK
by
RAVICHANDRA VASANT KINI
LL.B. University of Mumbai. India. 1997
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF LAWS
ATHENS. GEORGIA
1999
DERIVATIVES AND RISK FRAMEWORK
Approved:
by
RAVICHANDRA VASANT KINI
findU^ f.Mf£/
Major Professor
Date
Chairman. Reading Committee
^-plW^iq^^ I1i^
Date
Dean of the Graduate School
Ae !^V» .cxW ^
>
\^Q\
Date
DEDICATION
To my father, and all the time and effort he has spent on
me to make this come true.
in
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank my major professor Dr. Fredrick W.
Huszagh and Associate Dean Dr. Gabriel M.Wilner for their
patient guidance.
I would also like to thank Mr.Sujeet Kini for his views on
the subject and my colleague Els Reynaers for all the
help.
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER I: DIFFERENT CLASSES OF DERIVATIVES
AND THEIR USES 3
A. Classifications of Derivative Instruments 3
B. Classes of Derivatives 10
C
.
Derivative usage 3 3
CHAPTER II: DIFFERENT KINDS OF RISKS OPERATING
IN THE DERIVATIVE MARKET 41
A . Introduction 4 1
B . Market Risk 4 3
C Credit Risk 4 5
D Legal Risk 52
E Operational Risk 58
F Liquidity Risk 60
G Systemic Risk 62
v
VI
CHAPTER III: CASE ANALYSIS OF RECENT DERIVATIVE LOSSES 7
A. BT Securities and Gibson Greetings 71
B. BT Securities and Procter & Gamble 7 5
C
.
Orange County Bankruptcy 7 9
D. Reasons for These Losses 82
E. Barrings Bank Case 8 7
CHAPTER IV: DERIVATIVES REGULATION 93
A Introduction 9 3
B. SEC Regulatory Regime 94
C. Changes in Accounting Standards 100
D. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 102
E. The Federal Reserve 105
CONCLUSION 108
BIBLIOGRAPHY 110
INTRODUCTION
After the end of the cold war, the world has entered
a new era of corporate wars. Today, corporations have
become more powerful than nations. The world of finance
has evolved significantly in the past several years.
National economies are increasingly characterized by
global interdependence. Yet world commodity prices,
interest rates, and currency exchange rates have become
increasingly volatile. 1 Participation in the global
economy has increasingly meant exposure to the
unpredictability of macroeconomic forces out of the
control of any individual market participant. The
financial world has responded to these undesired risks of
market volatility with a steady stream of sophisticated
new investment instruments. 2
1 See Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk:
Innovative Finance or the Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1023, 1033 (1994)
2 See Peter M. Geckeler, Municipal Derivatives Use and The
Suitability Doctrine, 49 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 285
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the dynamics
of the fast growing international financial markets, and
to study in particular the risks associated with the
different kinds of financial instruments. The Barrings
Bank Crisis, Proctor and Gamble, Gibson Greetings cases
against Bankers Trust, and the Orange County Bankruptcy
has prompted regulatory authorities to focus on the risks
involved in the derivatives markets. In this paper, the
first chapter explains the basic working of the different
kinds of derivative instruments specially concentrating on
Swaps, Futures and Options. The second Chapter goes on to
explain, the risks involved in the uses of these
instruments, various hedging techniques used to control
these risk exposures. The third chapter explores the
reason for certain huge derivative losses (by analyzing
the cases above mentioned) and the fourth and the final
chapter goes into the recent regulation imposed on the
derivative markets.
CHAPTER I: DIFFERENT CLASSES OF DERIVATIVES AND THEIR USES
A. Classifications of Derivative Instruments
Derivatives 3 comprised of variations on forwards, futures,
options, and swaps, are a group of investment instruments
that market participants may use to free themselves from
undesired market risks. 4 There are basically two types of
derivatives depending upon the manner in which the are
traded, first Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives and
second exchange traded derivatives. OTC derivatives are
individual agreements between two parties to exchange
money based on fluctuations in the value of an underlying
"The term derivative . . . refers to all financial
instruments whose prices are dependent upon the price of
cash market items, whether those items be oil, metals,
soybeans, stocks or foreign currency." Kenneth M. Raisler
& Barbara J. Morgen, Legal Aspects of Commodity
Derivatives , in Swaps and Other Derivatives 1992, at 225,
228 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
778, 1992).
4 For example, airlines can purchase the option to buy jet
fuel at specified moderate prices in the future. If the
price of jet fuel rises significantly, they can exercise
their option and purchase jet fuel at moderate prices and
thereby avoid the risks of a volatile fuel market. This
process is known as "hedging" risk.
4market. 5 Swaps falls under this (OTC) category of
derivative. Other types of derivatives may be purchased
through exchanges 6 at prevailing prices. Futures and
options fall under this type of derivatives.
Again most derivative contracts can be classified as
either forward or option-based derivative contracts.
Forward-based products obligate the holder of the forward
contract to purchase the underlying asset at a specified
future time for a specified price. 8 Option-based products
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to Congressional
Reguesters, Pub. No. B-257099, Financial Derivatives:
Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System 8 (1994)
[hereinafter GAO Report] at 24-25.
A number of exchanges sell derivatives. For example, the
American Stock Exchange sells options on individual
stocks; the Chicago Board of Trade sells futures and
options on futures; the Chicago Board of Options Exchange
sells options on individual stocks; the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, Commodity
Exchange, Kansas City Board of Trade, Mid-America
Commodity Exchange, Minneapolis Grain Exchange, and New
York Cotton Exchange each sells futures and options on
futures; the New York Futures Exchange sells futures and
options on stock indexes; the New York Mercantile Exchange
sells futures and options on futures; the Pacific
Stock Exchange sells options on individual stocks, and the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange sells futures and options on
individual stocks, currencies, and stock indexes. Robert
W. Kolb, Financial Derivatives 79, Table 3.1 (1993).
Group of Thirty, Global Derivatives Study Group,
Derivatives : Practices and Principles 29 (1993) at 28.
Also Generally see Robert W. Kolb, supra note 6
See id. at 30. The creation of forward-based contracts
occurs from a variety of underlyings, including
provide the holder of the option the right, but not the
obligation, to buy or to sell the underlying assets for a
specified period of time at a designated price. 5
1 . Forward-Based Derivatives Products
Forward-based derivatives products include futures
and forwards contracts, both of which are agreements that
reguire the delivery of some underlying at a future date
at a certain price. 10 However, futures differ from forward
contracts in several ways. 11 Forwards are customized,
privately negotiated contracts that can involve long or
short-term obligations that typically do not exceed ten
years and are relatively simple to use and understand. 1 "
agricultural or physical commodities and currencies and
interest rates.
.See id. at 32. The creation of option-based products
occurs from a variety of underlying, such as bonds,
equities, currencies and commodities.
10 See John C. Hull, Options, Futures and Other Derivatives
1-4 (3d ed. 1997) .
See id. One of the ways futures differ from forwards
contracts is that the delivery date in a futures contract
is not specified. See id. at 4. The futures contract
indicates delivery date by month, and the futures exchange
dictates the time of the month when delivery must occur.
12 See id. at 1-2. A forwards contract is usually between
two institutional parties, one of which assumes a "long
In contrast, futures are standardized contracts that are
usually short-term obligations not exceeding one year and
which are traded through organized exchanges. 13
Additionally, parties to futures contracts are assured
payment because the clearinghouse associated with the
organized exchange guarantees the obligation of the
contracting parties. 14
position" by agreeing to buy some underlying asset at some
future date for a specified price. See id. at 1. The
other party to the contract assumes a "short position" by
agreeing to sell the underlying asset at the time and
price agreed upon by the two parties. See id.
13 See id. at 3-4
14 See Kolb, supra note 6, at 25-31. An important
institutional difference between forward and futures
market is the existence of a clearinghouse. See id. at
24. Each of the futures exchanges established
clearinghouses to, guarantee performance of the futures
contract. See id. The clearinghouse is interposed
between the parties to a futures contract. See id. The
clearinghouse becomes the seller to the purchaser of the
futures contract and the purchaser to the seller of the
contract. See id. at 24-25. The net position of the
clearinghouse is always zero because it enters into both
sides of the contract. See id. The absence of a
clearinghouse in the forwards market subjects the
contracting parties to far greater risk of non-performance
than in the futures market. See id. at 23-24.
Additionally, the clearinghouse provides a system that
permits futures traders to cancel their positions, rather
than make or take delivery of some underlying as required
by the contract. See id. at 27. To cancel a futures
position, futures investors must enter into an offsetting
or reversing trade by instructing their brokers to enter
into a transaction on the other side of the contract,
which effectively offsets the original position. See id.
For example, if investors are long, they can sell a
One of the most widely used forward-based derivatives
contracts is the swap contract, which can be categorized
as a series of forwards contracts. Swaps are usually for
longer terms than forwards or futures and, like forwards,
may be difficult to cancel or reverse. 15
2 . Option-Based Derivatives Products
While forward-based derivatives products obligate a
party to purchase an underlying asset, the holder of an
option-based derivatives contract has the option, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying asset for a
specified period of time at a specified price, referred to
as the strike price. 16 The option feature gives the option
holder the benefit of profiting from the favorable
movements of the market without being exposed to the
contract. Upon the reversing transaction, the investors
net out to zero because they hold both a long and a short
position in the same contract. Effectively, the two
contracts, one long and the other short, cancel each other
out. The absence of a clearinghouse in the forwards
market prevents either contracting party from canceling
its position through offsetting transactions.
15 See Kolb, supra note 6, at 27.
16 See Group of Thirty, Global Derivatives Study Group,
supra note 7, at 32.
corresponding losses. 1 ' A variety of underlying asset can
create options, such as bonds, equities, currencies and
commodities
.
18
Other options-based OTC contracts, such as caps, floors,
collars, and swaptions, are widely used derivatives
instruments. 19 Just as swaps are essentially a series of
forwards, caps,'" floors, 21 and collars"" is each
17 See Keith Redhead, Financial Derivatives 1 (1997) at 3.
18 See Hull, supra note 10 at 5
19 See Group of Thirty, Global Derivatives Study Group,
supra note7, at 33.
20 Interest-rate caps are a popular interest rate option
offered by financial institutions in the OTC market. See
Hull, supra note 10, at 397. A cap is an option agreement
that places a ceiling or cap on an interest rate, rates of
reference in a foreign exchange, or equity market. See
id. A cap is a portfolio of call options. See id. at
398. At the inception of the contract, the buyer pays a
premium to the seller who agrees to pay the buyer if on
the designated reference date specified in the contract a
reference rate is above the agreed upon cap rate. See id.
A debtor with a floating rate loan can use a cap to
protect against rises in the interest rates.
21 A floor contract is the opposite of a cap. See id. at
399. Under the floor contract, a seller agrees to pay the
buyer if the difference between the strike rate and
reference rate is negative. See id. A floor is a
portfolio of put options. See id. A floating-rate
investor can use a floor to protect against a drop in
interest rates.
22 A collar is the contemporaneous purchase of a cap and
the sell of a floor used with interest rates. See id.
Collars can be used as a means of holding interest rates
at a desired level. See id.
essentially a series of option contracts involving
periodic cash flows. Finally, swaptions are options on
swaps that give a buyer the right, but not the obligation,
to purchase a swap contract at a specified date." Unlike
other option-based products, the underlying instrument
associated with a swaption contract is another derivative.
Combining derivative contracts creates synthetic
instruments used by many derivatives dealers to meet
certain specific investor demand. 4 The process of
combining derivatives with other financial instruments,
derivatives or otherwise, is known as financial
engineering. " 5
Unlike capital investments, derivatives do not help
create wealth; they merely shift risk from one party to
another. The technology to manage market risks by the use
of derivatives represents an historic breakthrough in the
world of finance and stands to make the world a more
23 See id at 131
See The Handbook of Derivatives and Synthetics
:
Innovations , Technologies and Strategies in the Global
Markets, 13 (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman 1994)
[hereinafter Derivatives and Synthetics].
Some of the synthetic instruments that can be created
include straddles, strangles, bull spreads, and butterfly
spreads. See Kolb, supra note 6, at 177-85 (discussing
these technigues).
10
efficient place. The utility of derivatives to help manage
risk has been quickly recognized; in the past ten years,
their use has increased tremendously.
B. Classes of Derivatives
1 . Swaps
a) The Working of Swap Markets .
In financial history no other market has grown as fast
as the swap market. From its inception in 1979, the total
swaps outstanding have grown from virtually nothing to
over 50.997 trillion dollars at the end of 1998. 26 The
volume of swap transactions reflects the tremendous
importance of this type of instrument in the international
financial markets. 27
The importance of swaps is also due to the fact that
it has multifarious uses. Swaps are utilized to undertake
at least three types of functions:
See < Http ; //www. isda.org/d6. html .
>
John F. Marshal & Kenneth R. Kapner, Understanding swaps
(1993
11
• Undertake capital market arbitrage between various
markets as a result lowering the financial cost of
borrowers and increasing the asset yield of investors.
• To circumvent adverse market conditions or
regulations, which would make standard capital market
transactions difficult or impossible. 28
• To manage and reduce, the risk of both the interest
rate and currency rate fluctuations.
b) Definition
A swap is a contractual agreement evidenced by a single
document in which two parties called counter-parties agree
to make periodic payments to each other. Contained in the
agreement are the specification of the currencies to be
exchanged, rate of interest applicable to each, timetables
by which payments are to be made and other provisions
bearing the relationship between the parties. 29
Swap contracts are tailor made contracts to meet the
needs of the individual counter-parties. They are created
with the help of specialist who are either brokers or
Satyajit Das, Swap & Derivative Financing (1994
~
' See Understanding Swaps supra note 27 at 3.
12
dealers. Most of the times the role of the brokers and
dealers is played by multinational banks and financial
institutions. Swaps are the over the counter (OTC) type of
transactions as opposed to the organized exchanges on
which highly standardized contracts like futures and
options are traded.
c) History of Swaps
The history of the development of the swap transaction
is much disputed and debated one. However, there appears
to be an agreement that the concept of swaps originated
after the collapse of the Brettonwoods Agreement. 30 This
agreement concluded among representatives of noncommunist
countries provided for a fixed exchange rate system. 31 The
effect of this was that there was a dramatic increase in
the exchange rate volatility, which created ideal
conditions for swap instruments. However, it is
interesting to note that a type of currency swap
Wilford, D.S., Strategic Risk Exposure Management.
Working paper #3, in working Papers in Risk Management,
Chase Manhattan Bank, February 1987.
31 Price; The Technical Evolution of the Currency Swap
Products, in swap finance, Vol. I, ( B. Ant ed. 1986 ), at
53
13
transaction involving foreign currency and gold has a long
history. These transactions were usually undertaken
between a number of key central banks and the Bank of
International of Settlement. They were similar to short-
dated foreign exchange swaps combining spot sale/purchase
of a currency with simultaneous agreement to buy or sell
the currency sometime in future. This swap network was
designed to create additional international reserves
through a cross-crediting system to facilitate central
bank stabilization of the international monetary systems.'3 "
d) Modern Currency Swaps
i . Introduction
The modern day currency swaps were a extension of
parallel and back to back loans that originated in the
United Kingdom as a means to circumvent foreign exchange
controls, the purpose of these controls being to prevent
an outflow of the British capital. 33 The Back-to-back and
32 See Das, supra note 28 at 15
Powers J.G. The Vortex of Finance. Intermarket Magazine
3, no. 2 (February 1986): 27-38
14
parallel loans involved two different corporations in two
different countries. Both the companies would borrow an
equivalent amount of money in their home countries and
lend it to the other. By this arrangement, each company
would have access to the capital market in the foreign
country, without any exchanges of currencies in the
foreign exchange markets.
For example, U.S company lending dollars to a
subsidiary of a U.K corporation in the U.S and in turn the
U.K Corporation lending sterling pound to U.K Subsidiary
of a U.S. Corporation in the U.K.
U.K U.S
U.K. Company
Loan proceeds I Interest +
Pounds I principal
U.S. company
U.S. Company
Loan proceeds I Interest +
Dollars I principal
U.K. company
Exhibit 1: Parallel loans
The back-to-back loans work similarly but involve two
corporations. A U.S corporation lending dollars to a U.K
corporation directly and the U.K Corporation lending
sterling pound to the U.S Corporation directly.
U.K
U.K. Company
15
U.S
Pounds int . + Principle
Pounds loan proceeds
Dollars loan proceeds
Dollars int.+ principle
U.S. Company
Exhibit 2: Back to Back Loan
ii. Problems in back-to- back and parallel loans
The first problem of the back-to back and parallel
loans is that the party with the requirement of this type
of a financing has to locate another party having similar
image financing requirements, called matched needs. Thus,
the search costs associated with finding such party can be
considerable 34
The second problem, of both the parallel and back-to-
back loans are that there are two independent agreements
that exist independent of one another, if one party
defaults the other is not relived of its obligation. To
avoid this, separate sets of clauses were needed to be
drafted. 35
34 See Marshall Kapner, Supra note 27 at 5
35
see Das, supra note 28 at 57, supra note 27 at 5
16
Thirdly, accountants differ on how parallel and back-
to-back loans should be reported by the parent company on
its balance sheet. 36
Some time the annual fee payable by one party to
another (interest differential) may or may not be tax
deductible. 37 Therefore, to remove these deficiencies, a
new financial instrument was devised in the form of
currency swaps.
e) Currency Swaps
The currency swaps were devised to remove the
disadvantages of the parallel and back-to-back loans
without disturbing their advantages. The first, currency
swap was arranged in the United Kingdom in the year 1976. 38
However, the landmark currency swap took place between the
36 See Das, supra note 28 at 57
See id
38 See id
17
World Bank and IBM as counter parties in 1981, as result
of which currency swaps became an established feature of
the international swap market. 39
i . Basic Currency Swap Structure
The basic structure of a swap is relatively simple
and is the same for Interest Rate Swaps, Currency Swaps,
Equity Swaps and Commodity Swaps. The complexity of a swap
is more in the extensive documentation needed to fully
specify the contract terms and special provisions that
should be included to tailor the swap to a specific need.
The basic currency swap involves three distinct sets of
cash flows:
1. The initial exchange of principals;
2. The interest payments made by each counter party to the
other;
3. The final exchanges or re-exchange of principals. 40
Park, Y.S. Currency Swaps as a Long- Term International
financial Technique . Journal of International Business
Studies 15, no. 3 (1984): 47-54.
40 Bectstorm, The development of the swap market, in swap
finance, volume I (B.Ante ed 1986) at 6, C. Beidlerman,
Financial swaps ( 1985 ) at 20
18
Both the initial exchange of principals and any re-
exchange of principals are made at the spot exchange rate
prevailing at the time of contracting. While this may
initially seem strange, it is logical, as the difference
between forward and spot exchange rates has already been
accounted for in the interest rates on the swap. 41
The early currency swaps, like the early interest rate
swaps, are made directly between the two end-users. A
stockbroker served to identify and to match the two end-
users and collected a commission for its trouble. In these
early currency swaps, each end user would typically borrow
funds in his domestic market and then lend these borrowed
funds to its swap counter-party. A typical currency swap
between two end-users, together with the accompanying cash
market transactions, is depicted in Exhibit 3,4 and 5.
41 Das supra note: 2 at 73-74
19
Basic Currency Swaps : Exchange of Principals
(An exchange of borrowings)
Currency A Principal
End-user 1
(Counter party)
Currency B Principal
End-user 2
(Counter party)
Exhibit: 3
Basic Currency Swaps : Service payments
( An exchange of borrowings)
floating/fixed
rate in
currency A
floating/fixed
rate in
End-user 1
(Counter party)
currency B
Currency A Prin
Currency B Prin
End-user 2
(Counter party)
Exhibit:
4
Basic Currency Swaps : Re-exchange of Principals
( An exchange of borrowings)
20
currency A currency B
Currency A Prin.
End-user 1
(Counter party)
Currency B prin.
End-user 2
(Counter party)
Exhibit: 5
The earliest currency swaps, like the back-to-back
and the parallel loans that preceded them, were created as
a vehicle to circumvent controls on the capital flows. 4-
It was not long, however, before the real value of these
instruments as a vehicle to reduce finance costs were
discovered.
42 Antl, Currency swaps; Parallel loans, straight currency
swaps and forward foreign exchange trade contracts in swap
finance, Volume I, ( B. Antl ed. 1986 ), at 11
21
ii . Intermediary Swap Transaction
Lets consider a complete example of how currency
swaps can be used to reduce the costs. The specific swap
that we will look at is a variant of the plain vanilla
fixed-for-floafing currency swaps. In this particular
swap, one counter-party is paying a fixed rate of interest
and the other is paying a floating rate of interest.
Suppose that counter party A can borrow deutsche
marks for seven years at a fixed rate of 9 percent and can
borrow seven-year dollar at a floating rate of one-year
LIBOR. 43 Counterparty B, on the other hand, can borrow
seven years deutsche marks for 10.1 percent and can borrow
seven year dollar at a floating rate of one year LIBOR. As
it happens counterparty A needs floating rate dollar
financing and counterparty B needs fixed rate Deutsche
marks financing.
Now suppose we have a swap dealer that makes deutsche
mark for dollar currency swaps. It is currently prepared
to pay a fixed rate of 9.45 % on deutsche marks against
one year LIBOR, and is prepared to pay one-year LIBOR
43 LIBOR is the abbreviation for London Interbank offered
Rate, an interest rate related to eurocurrency floating
rate loans, P.Wood , Law and Practice of International
Finance 252 et seg. (1980)
22
against a fixed-rate of 9.55% on deutsche marks. The
counterparties borrow in their respective cash markets.
Counterparty A borrows fixed-rate deutsche marks and
counterparty B borrows floating rate dollars and then both
enter into swaps with the swap dealer.
Currency Swap: Debt Service With Swap Payments
Cash Market Transaction
9% DEM
Debt Market
Deutschemarks
Debt Market
Dollars
USD LIBOR
Counterparty
A
9.4-5% DEM
USD LIBOR
9.55% DEM
Exhibit: 6
Notice that while counterparty A borrows deutsche marks,
the swap converts the deutsche marks to dollars. Notice
also that these dollars have a floating rate character of
23
LIBOR minus 45 basis points. 44 This represents a 45 basis
points savings compared to a direct borrowing in the
floating rate dollar market. Similarly, Counterparty B
borrows dollars but uses the swap to convert dollars into
deutschemarks . These deutschemarks have a net cost of
9.55%. This represents a 55 basis points savings compared
to a direct borrowing in the fixed-rate deutschemarks
market. Thus swap can be used with the appropriate cash
market transaction to convert both the currency
denomination of finance and the character of the interest
cost
.
f ) Interest Rate Swaps :
Interest Rate Swap (IRS) is a transaction in which
two parties agree to exchange streams of cash flows based
on hypothetical or notional principal amounts whereby one
stream is calculated with reference to a floating interest
rate and the other stream is calculated based on the fixed
interest rate. 45 An IRS can be used to transform one type
44
1 basis point= 0.01 %
45 Grey/Kurz/Strup, Interest rate swaps, in swap finance,
volume I at 3 ( B. antl. Ed. 1986), J.F. Marshal supra
note; 27 at 30
24
of interest obligation into another and thereby enable a
swap participant to tailor its interest obligations to
meet its needs in a given rate environment.
In a IRS the notional principals to be exchanged are
identical in amount and involve the same currency, as
such, they can be dispensed with. Furthermore since
periodic payments called interest in this case, are also
in the same currency, therefore only interest differential
needs to be exchanged on the periodic payments dates
assuming the payment dates match. 46
IRS has many uses. One that is particularly important is
the reduction of financial costs. For an IRS to be viable
for reducing the financial cost, one party must have
access to comparatively cheap fixed-rate funds but desire
floating rate funding while another party must have access
to have comparatively cheap floating rate funding but
desires a fixed rate funding. By entering into a swap with
a swap dealer, both parties can obtain the form of
financing they desire and simultaneously exploit their
comparative advantages. 47
46 id
47 Das supra note 28 at 58-60
25
g) Commodity Swaps
In a commodity swap, the first counterparty makes
periodic payments to the second counterparty at a per unit
fixed price for a given notional quantity of some
commodity. The second counterparty pays the first a per
unit floating price for a given notional quantity of some
commodity. The commodities may be the same or different.
No exchange of notional commodities takes place between
the counter parties of the swap. All exchanges of
commodity, if any, take place in the cash markets. 48
2 . Futures
a) Introduction to future market
Futures contracts are highly standardized contracts
calling for deferred delivery of some underlining asset or
requiring a final cash settlement based on the value of
the underlining asset on the contracts final settlement
date. 4 Futures contracts trade on future exchanges. A
48 See Marshall supra note; 27 at 31
49 Id at 17
26
future contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset at
a certain time in the future for a certain price. 50 The
two largest exchanges on which Future contract trade are
the Chicago board of trade (CBOT) and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). 51
Example of corn futures trade on the CBOT : In March, an
investor in New York might call a broker with instructions
to buy 5000 bushels of corn for July delivery. The broker
would immediately pass these instructions on to a trader
on the floor of the CBOT. At about the same time, another
investor in Kansas might instruct a broker to sell 5,000
bushels of corn for July delivery. These instructions
would also be passed on to a trader on the floor of the
CBOT. The two floor traders would meet and agree on a
price to be paid for the corn in July, and the deal would
be done.
The investor in New York who agreed to buy has what
is termed a long futures position; the investor in Kansas
who agreed to sell has what is termed as a short futures
position. The price agreed to by the two traders on the
floor of the exchange is known as the futures price. The
50 id.
51 Bob Reynolds, Understanding Derivatives, 5 ( 1995).
27
laws of supply and demand determine this price, like any
other price. If at a particular time, more floor traders
wish to sell July corn, than buy July corn, then the price
will go down. New buyers will enter the market so that the
balance between buyers and sellers is maintained. 5.
Provisions for margin requirements, daily
settlements, trading practices, commissions, bid-ask
spreads and the role of the exchange-clearing house are
some of the prominent regulatory features of the market. 5
b) History of future markets
The futures market can be traced back to the middle
ages. They were originally developed to meet the needs of
the farmers and the merchants. There is uncertainty about
the price that the farmer will receive for the grain
before the harvest time and there is also uncertainty
amongst the merchants as to what price they would buy the
grains, this uncertainty was overcome by the future
contracts. The CBOT was established in 1948 to bring the
farmers and the merchants together. Initially its main
52 Hull, supra note 10 at 2
53 id.
28
task was to standardize the quantities and the qualities
of the qrain that were traded. Within a few years futures-
type of contracts was developed. Speculators soon became
interested in the contract and found trading contract to
be more attractive than trading the grains itself. The
CBOT now offers future contracts on many different
underlining assets including corn, oats, soybeans-meal,
soybean oil, wheat, treasury bonds and treasury notes 54 . In
1874, the Chicago Mercantile exchange was established
providing a market for butter, eggs, poultry, and other
perishable agricultural products. The International
Monetary Market (IMM) was formed as a division of Chicago
Mercantile Exchange in 1972 for future trading in foreign
currency. The currency's future traded on IMM now include
the British Pound, the Canadian dollar, the Japanese Yen,
the German Mark, Swiss Franc and the Australian dollar.
The IMM also trades a one-month LIBOR futures contact, a
Treasury bill Fc and an Euro-dollar futures contract 55 .
54 id
55 • jid
29
3 . Options
a) Introduction to Options
Options contracts have been traded on the exchange
for a far shorter period of time than future contracts. 5
Options contracts are one of the most popular option-based
derivative products. Options contracts include privately
negotiated OTC options contracts, as well as exchange-
traded options such as options on individual stocks, stock
indices, interest rate instruments, precious metal
indexes, foreign currencies, and future contracts. 5 The
largest exchange for trading stock options is the Chicago
board of Options Exchange. 5, Options contracts are either
call or put options, and can be purchased by an investor
at a price referred to as the premium. 59 The date in the
56 See Hull, , supra note 10 at 5
See Hull, supra note 10 at 4-5, Options on stocks began
trading in 1973. Since that time, the options market has
grown dramatically, evidenced by options trading on many
exchanges throughout the world.
58 id
See Kolb, supra note 6, at 77. An investor who
purchases a call option receives the right to buy a
specified instrument during a designated time period,
while the purchase of a put option gives the investor the
right to sell a specified instrument during a designated
time period. See id. at 77-78. An investor purchases the
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contract is known as the expiration date, maturity date or
the exercise date. In the case of exchange-traded options,
a clearinghouse will assume the role of counter-party to
both the owner and writer of the option, thus guaranteeing
performance of the options contract. 60 In contrast, OTC
privately negotiated options contracts are not guaranteed
through any clearinghouse; instead, both the owner and
writer of the options contract assume the risk that the
other party will not perform the contract. 61 There is a
basic difference between Options exercised in Europe form
option contract by paying the premium to the seller of the
option, who is referred to as the writer of the option.
See id. The writer of a call option agrees to sell the
underlying instrument upon exercise of the option by the
owner, and the writer of a put option agrees to purchase
the underlying instrument upon exercise of the option by
the owner. See id. The price at which the underlying
stock will be paid if the buyer exercises the option is
referred to as the strike price. See id. Option
contracts typically expire within three to six months of
writing them.
The single clearinghouse for U.S. exchanged traded
options is the Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC"). See
Kolb, supra note 6, at 7. The OCC operates in a manner
similar to the clearinghouses for futures exchanges by
acting as an intermediary in all options transactions, and
by guaranteeing the options writer's performance. See id.
As with the futures market, the buyer and seller of the
options contract are not obliged to one another, but
rather are obliged to the OCC.
61 See Joseph L. Motes, III, A Primer on the Trade and
Regulation of Derivative Instruments, 49 S.M.U.L. Rev.
579, 584-5 (1996).
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those exercised in America in so far as a European option
can be exercised only on the maturity date whereas an
American option can be exercised anytime during its life.
Illustration: An investor instructs a broker to buy one
call option contract on IBM stock with a strike price of
$100 and a maturity date in May. The broker will relay
this instruction to a trader on the floor of the CBOE.
This trader then finds another trader who wants to sell
one May contract on IBM with a strike price of $100. A
price will be agreed upon and the deal will be done.
Suppose the agreed price is $6 for the option to buy one
share. In the US one stock option contract is a contract
to buy or sell 100 shares. The investor must arrange for
$600 to be remitted to the exchange through the broker.
The exchange will then arrange for this amount to be
passed on to the party on the other side. The stock price
does not have to equal the exercise price. The IBM stock
in this example can be $102 at the time the deal is done.
In our example, the investor has obtained at a cost of
$600 the right to buy 100 IBM for $100 each. The party on
the other side of the transaction has received $600 and
agreed to sell 100 sell for $100 per share, if the
investor chooses to exercise the option.
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b) History of Options Market
In the early 1900s, a group of firms set up the put and
the call brokers association. The aim of the association
was to bring the buyers and the sellers together. An
investor who wanted to buy an option could contact one of
the member firms. This firm would attempt to find a seller
or a writer of the option either from his own clients or
other member firms. If no sellers could be found the firm
would undertake the right to option itself in return for
what was deemed to be an appropriate price. The options
market of the Put and Call brokers and dealers association
suffered from two deficiencies. First, there was no
secondary market. Second, there was no assurance that the
writer of the option would honor the contract. In 1973,
the Chicago Board set up a new exchange; the Chicago Board
of Options Exchange specifically for the purpose of
trading stock options. In the 1980s the markets developed
in the US for options in foreign exchange, options on
stock indices and options on future contracts.
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C . Derivative usage
The most common uses of financial derivatives are: (1)
to hedge against some risk; (2) to speculate on predicted
changes in interest rates, currencies, and the prices of
securities and commodities; and (3) to extract riskless
profits through arbitrage, including "regulatory
arbitrage . " 62
1 . Hedging
Hedging is thought to be the most common and perhaps the
most beneficial use of derivatives. An entity exposed to
an unwanted risk may "hedge" (i.e., eliminate or reduce)
that risk by entering into an offsetting derivatives
transaction. 63
Hedgers typically use derivatives to reduce financial
risks associated with their existing asset/liability
portfolios. 64 A hedger in the derivatives market protects
See, Frank J. Fabozzi, The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed
Securities 483-532 (3d ed. 1992).
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and The Costs of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. Corp. L. 211, 223 ( 1997 )
.
64 See Hull, supra note 10 at 11. Through financial
engineering, derivatives instruments can also be used to
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itself by purchasing a derivative instrument that is
expected to change in value in the opposite direction of
the hedger's asset or liability. 6 For example, a United
States company owing a debt of $1 million pounds to a
British supplier due to be paid in ninety days is faced
with the financial risk that on the date the obligation is
due, the currency rate will have increased. 66 If the
currency exchange rate on day one of the obligation is
1.605, the company can protect against an increase in the
currency by entering into a long forward contract to buy
$1 million pounds in ninety days for $1,605 million. If
the currency rate increases to 1.70 on day ninety, the
company saves $94,400 because it protected itself against
the increase with the purchase of the forward contract. 6
create synthetic assets or liabilities which cannot be
purchased through the organized exchanges.
Market participants use derivatives to hedge against
adverse changes in the value of assets or liabilities that
result from fluctuations in an interest rate, or exchange
rate, or the price of stock, commodity or index. See also
Anne Schwimmer, Swaps Debate Spills Over into End-User
Surveys: ISDA vs. Greenwich: Will the Real Numbers Please
Stand Up?, Investment Dealers' Dig., July 15, 1996, at 11.
66 See Hull, supra notelO, at 11.
67 See id.
68 See id. If the currency rate decreases below 1.605, the
company loses by entering into the forwards contract. See
id.
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2 . Speculation
Perhaps the next most common use of financial
derivatives is speculation. A speculator uses derivatives
because they provide a more efficient means of speculating
than cash trading in the underlying financial instrument
or index.
Speculators buy and sell derivatives to make profits,
not to reduce risk.° 9 Investors may also purchase
derivatives to speculate by attempting to profit from
anticipated changes in the market prices. 70 The
speculators do not own the underlying asset, but instead
use derivatives as a cheaper way to try to profit from
movements in market rates or prices. Speculators can
realize profits by betting on whether the price of an
underlying asset, such as stocks, will rise or fall. 71 The
speculator is merely required to pay a premium. '" For
Speculators are necessary parties to derivatives market
because they facilitate hedging and assist in maintaining
price stability.
/0 See Hull, supra note 10, at 11.
;1 See Hull, supra note 10, at 11.
72 See id. at 12 n.5.
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example, if the stock price is $32 per share, a speculator
who believes the price will rise can purchase a call
option with a strike price of $35 for $.50 per option.
If the stock price does not rise to $35 during the life of
option contract, the speculator loses $.50 per option or
100 percent of its investment. 7 ' But if the stock rises to
$40, then the speculator realizes a profit of $4.50 per
option or 900 percent of its original investment.' 1
3 . Arbitrage
Finally, derivatives are used for arbitrage, i.e., to
capture riskless profits based on pricing anomalies among
financial markets and products. Derivatives thus allow
financial market participants to "fill gaps" left by the
unavailability of particular types of financial
instruments. For example, if a sovereign does not have a
73 See id at 12
74 See id
75 See id
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long-term corporate debt market, investors may use
interest rate or currency swaps to generate fixed
liabilities.
The ease of arbitrage has increased dramatically and is
due in part to the profound changes in modern capital
markets, including global deregulation. Capital markets
now cross national borders quickly and easily, and
encourage creation of novel financial instruments and
transactions to capitalize on changes in regulation and
law. ' The ease of arbitrage and the elasticity of
international financial markets also make it difficult for
one country to impose restrictions or costs on parties to
financial transactions. 71 As a result, there are
significant costs, as well as benefits, associated with
arbitrage
.
7o See Partnoy, supra note 63 at 226
Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Uniimited
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 Yale L.J.
387, 391 (1992)
According to Second Circuit Judge and Yale Law School
professor Ralph K. Winter, the federal securities laws
registration and periodic disclosure provisions "will die
of their own accord because they are inefficient enough
that they deter foreign companies from choosing to
register their stock in this country." Ralph K. Winter,
Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 Duke
L.J. 945, 947 n.7 (1993)
.
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Arbitrage opportunities may exist for various reasons
and, depending on the reason, arbitrage may or may not
benefit society as a whole. According to the classical
theory of arbitrage, the process of exploiting an
arbitrage opportunity will eliminate it, and the process
of eliminating arbitrage opportunities will lead to an
efficient result. However, a substantial number of sources
of derivatives arbitrage are structural in nature;
consequently, increased arbitrage activity may reduce the
size of the arbitrage profit, but will not necessarily
eliminate it. 7 ' Such structural conditions especially
prevail for regulatory arbitrage, and there is no reason
to expect regulatory arbitrage opportunities to disappear
until the relevant regulations are changed. Moreover, this
process of attempting to eliminate such permanent
arbitrage opportunities likely will lead to inefficient
results as funds are diverted to financial transactions
with minimal private value, and negative social value.
Regulatory arbitrage consists of those financial
transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or
capture profit opportunities created by differential
regulations or laws. The numerous opportunities for
See Satyajit Das, supra note 28 at 154
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regulatory arbitrage derive from a widely-understood,
basic concept in modern finance: a party to financial
transactions may use a variety of different trading
strategies to achieve the same economically-equivalent
position. 80 As a response to costly financial regulation,
regulatory arbitrage opportunities have generated a great
range of derivatives transactions. 81
In practice, financial intermediaries are constantly
structuring new financial derivatives in response to
changes in financial regulation. 82 Regulation that imposes
costs on non-derivatives transactions creates an incentive
for parties to structure economically equivalent
derivatives transactions that avoid the reach of the
regulation or reduce its cost. Available tested evidence
supports the conclusion that the driving force behind the
development of many financial derivatives is the desire to
reduce regulatory costs. 83 Derivatives are exceedingly
80 See Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments : Lessons
for the Regulatory State, 21 J. Corp. L. 69, 78 (1995)
81 id
82 See, Peter G. Morrissey, Note, Regulating Risk m
Financial Markets : Private Insurance for Public Funds, 69
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1168-73 (1996).
83 See Grundfest, supra note 77, at 416
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malleable 84 and often are economically equivalent to an
existing security, yet may receive differing tax,
accounting, or other regulatory treatment. 8 Consequently,
derivatives have proven an efficient mechanism for eluding
the costs of regulation imposed by taxes, 86 accounting
requirements, investment restrictions, and government
subsidies
.
84 Professor Grundfest has argued that "intermediaries such
as investment banks, commercial banks, and mutual funds
can structure myriad instruments and transactions
specifically designed to (achieve the desired objective)."
Grundfest, supra note 77, at 408.
85 See id
For a general description of the tax and accounting
treatment of derivatives, see Robert Baer, Understanding
Derivatives and Financial Instruments, 72 Taxes 929
(1994); Robert H. Scarborough, Different Rules for
Different Players and Products: The Patchwork Taxation of
Derivatives, 72 Taxes 1031 (1994).
CHAPTER II: DIFFERENT KINDS OF RISKS OPERATING IN THE
DERIVATIVE MARKET
A. Introduction
In developing derivatives contracts specifically for a
particular firm, the dealer acquire information about the
company's assets, liabilities, and financial objectives
and advise the corporation as to what its objectives
should be and how to obtain them. 8 Because of the advisory
role assumed by the derivative dealer selling the
instruments, the client's financial officers assume that
the dealer created the derivative contract with the
company's preferred level of risk in mind. 8 ' The financial
officers may, therefore, enter into derivatives contracts
without a clear understanding of the risks involved. 89
87 See, e.g., Bruce A. Baird et al., Current Legal Theories
in Litigation Involving Derivative Contracts, C123 ALI-ABA
300 n.9 (1995) (quoting Interview by Inside Opinion (CNBC
television broadcast, Jan. 19, 1995) ) (quoting SEC
Commissioner Richard Roberts, as stating that "derivatives
are not inherently bad or good, but they are volatile.").
88 See id.
89 See id. (pointing out that most end-users do not have the
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However, banks and other financial intermediaries may
create and sell derivatives without accurately explaining
the risks involved. 90 When the parties to the contract do
not fully understand the terms of a particular
transaction, obvious problems arise.
Although derivatives are generally perceived as very
risky products, the dangers presented by derivative
instruments are neither new nor unique. The risks
associated with derivatives-market, credit, legal,
operational, liquidity and systemic risk-are the same
risks found in more traditional lending and investment
activities. However, because OTC derivatives are
customized to meet the needs of a particular counterparty,
these risks are often assembled in new and unexpected
ways, sometimes leading to unforeseen losses. 91
necessary resources to understand and monitor the risks).
It is possible that the banks or their representatives
do not fully understand (or appreciate) the risks involved
with particular derivatives. The increased reliance of
traders on computers to handle customer accounts and to
perform their other responsibilities has brought new
dangers to Wall Street. Jeffrey Hoffman, Wall Street Bets
Its Future on Computer Whizzes: Markets: But Some Find
There is Economic Peril When Intelligence is Substituted
for Wisdom. O.C.'s Bankruptcy is Often Cited as a Case in
Point, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1995, at D7
.
91 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. 94-133,
FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 9 (1994) [hereinafter GAO]
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B . Market Risk
Market risk is the risk of loss from adverse price
movements in the market. Dealers typically manage market
risk on a portfolio basis, combining offsetting positions
to determine net risk exposure and then hedging any net
excess risk in the futures or options markets or through
92derivatives hedging trades. Managing the market risk of
derivatives is closely related to the pricing of
derivatives, specifically to options pricing techniques.
Options hedging and pricing techniques are based on
theories first developed in 1973 by Fischer Black and
Myron Scholes (the Black-Scholes options pricing model). 9
The Black-Scholes model identified five factors that
affect the price of any option: the price of the
underlying, the exercise price of the option, the time to
expiration of the option, the volatility of the price of
the underlying security, and the risk-free rate of
92 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERIVATIVE
MARKETS AND THEIR REGULATION, 90 (1993) [hereinafter
CFTC]
.
93 See Hull, supra note 10 at 228-249
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return. The model provides a method for hedging options
with the underlying asset, thus allowing for arbitrage
pricing and hedging. 94
There is a difference in the risk profile of OTC and
exchange-traded derivatives. Because exchange-traded
derivatives are, by definition, actively traded, the
market performs a constant pricing function, relieving the
portfolio manager of this duty. 95 For many highly
customized OTC derivatives, however, there is no trading
market and, therefore, no market price. Market
participants determine price using elaborate (and
generally proprietary) pricing models. Recent evidence
indicates that great differences exist in proprietary risk
pricing models and in sophistication regarding market
risks generally, with the large dealers having an
informational advantage over most end-users. 96
94 See id at 228
Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial
Bingo": A Risk-based Approach To understanding
Derivatives, 23 J.corp.L.l, 13 (1997).
96 See CFTC, supra note 92, at 96-97 (stating that an
"adequate understanding of the risks is not equally
distributed among all users of the marketplace")
.
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C . Credit Risk
1 . Measuring Credit Risk
Credit risk is the risk of loss in the event of default
by a counterparty. Although credit risk is present in
every financial transaction between the trade date and
settlement date, due to the inherent leverage in every
derivatives contract, derivatives credit risk may change
substantially over time in response to changes in market
risk. 9 Assessing credit risk reguires answering two
guestions. First, if counterparty defaulted today, what
would it cost to replace the transaction? In other words,
what is current exposure? Second, if the counterparty
defaulted at some point in the future, what is a
reasonable estimate of the potential replacement costs or,
what is potential exposure? 98 Determining current exposure
is relatively straightforward and entails simply
ascertaining the current market value of a derivative, or
97 CFTC, supra note 92, at 97. In fact, credit risk is
present in every contract between the execution date and
performance date and may change over time due to changes
in market factors. It is only the inherent leverage of a
derivatives contract that sets it apart from other types
of contracts.
98 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 47. GROUP OF THIRTY,
supra note 7, at 47.
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the replacement cost. ' Replacement cost can be positive
or negative, depending on changes in the underlying asset
since the trade date of the transaction. When replacement
cost is negative, the remaining party incurs no loss in
the event of a counterparty's default. 100
Potential exposure is more difficult to measure because
it reguires a subjective determination of what the
replacement cost of a transaction could be at some future
date. This estimate is primarily a function of the time
remaining to maturity on the contract and the expected
volatility of the underlying asset. Portfolio managers
generally use historical simulation studies or options
pricing models to assess potential exposure, which
involves modeling the volatility of the underlying asset
and the effect of its movements on the value of the
transaction. These techniques produce two measures of
See Henderson, An Analaysis of Interest Rate and
Currency Swaps, 11 N.C.J. Int'l. L. & Com. Reg. 497, 502
(1986)
.
100 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 47. This contrasts
with the credit risk of traditional lending activities.
The lender faces loss on a loan any time the borrower
defaults. Moreover, the creditor faces default risk on the
principal amount of the loan as well as on interest
payments. In a derivative, however, the notional principal
generally is not at risk. For these reasons, the impact of
credit differentials on swap spreads is much smaller than
that on loans.
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potential exposure: expected exposure and maximum, or
worst case, exposure. 101 Expected exposure is the mean of
all possible replacement costs, where replacement cost is
equal to market value, if positive, and zero, if negative.
Expected exposure is thus the best estimate of the present
value of the positive replacement costs that are likely to
materialize. The worst case exposure is calculated based
on adverse price movements in the underlying asset which
are so extreme that they are unlikely to be exceeded.
Notably, the credit risk profiles of option-based
derivatives and forward-based derivatives differ.
Counterparty risk in forward-based derivatives is two-
sided: both the buyer and the seller can suffer a
potential loss in the event of default by the other party.
Although counterparty default in a forward-based
transaction will cause a loss only if replacement cost is
positive, because either party could ultimately be in this
position at maturity, each party faces credit risk. In
contrast, counterparty risk in option-based derivatives is
one-sided. The buyer of the option pays a premium up
front. The seller, however, is not required to perform
101 See id at 47
102 See id
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unless and until the option is exercised. This exposes the
buyer to the risk of counterparty default without a
corresponding risk to the seller. 103
In addition, the credit risk profiles of exchange-traded
and OTC derivatives differ sharply. First, the
contractual obligation in an exchange-traded derivative is
entered into directly with the exchange clearinghouse
rather than with an individual counterparty, making the
clearinghouse the guarantor of all exchange transactions
and dispersing credit risk among all clearinghouse
participants. This effectively transforms counterparty
credit risk into the much lower risk of the failure of the
clearing organization itself. To manage its own credit
risk, the clearinghouse generally enters into an equal
offsetting position for each trade, leaving itself with
zero net exposure. 104
Finally, exchanges impose minimum capital requirements
on their participants and require the posting of
collateral in the form of a margin account. After the
daily marking-to-market, losses are deducted from and
103 See id at 48.
104 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 32; CFTC, supra note
92, at 97-98.
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gains are added to the trader's account. If the account
balance drops below a certain minimum level, the account
holder must post additional capital or the account will be
closed, eliminating default in all but the most extreme
cases of price volatility. 105
A subcategory of credit risk is settlement risk. 10 *
Settlement risk is "the risk that a party which has
fulfilled its obligations under an agreement by delivering
funds or property will not receive within the agreed
settlement timeframes the funds or property owed by its
counterparty." 107 One aspect of settlement risk arises
from the fact that financial transactions rarely settle on
the trade date. If prices move in one party's favor after
the trade date, that party could suffer a loss if her
counterparty refuses to exchange on the settlement date.
Most settlement risk, however, is due to the fact that
105 Victor Brudney & William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance,
8 (4th ed. Supp. 1996)
106 Some studies have treated settlement risk as a separate
risk independent of credit risk. See, e.g., GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 7; CFTC, supra note 92, at 97-106
(discussing credit and settlement risks). This article
follows those studies that treat settlement risk as a
subset of credit risk. See, e.g., Basle Committee On
Banking Supervision, Risk Management Guidelines For
Derivatives, (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Basle, Italy)
July 27, 1994, at 13 [hereinafter BASLE COMMITTEE].
107
see CFTC, supra note 92, at 102.
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transactions are rarely settled simultaneously. Parties
face the largest settlement risk, therefore, on the
settlement date itself, when the entire value of the
contract could be at risk if payment exchanges are not
synchronized. 108
2 . Managing Credit Risk
Credit risk has not been as great a problem in the
derivatives market as has market risk. Because derivatives
market participants are often borrowers in the public
market, they are generally investment grade-rated. 1 ' In
addition, credit losses due to derivatives activities have
been very low. 110 Nevertheless, because OTC derivative
transactions are not subject to the same regulatory and
self-regulatory credit risk reduction mechanisms as
exchange-traded derivatives, such as clearinghouse
organizations, margin requirements, and capital
108 See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 4 9-50. The
settlement risk of some derivatives, such as interest rate
swaps, is greatly reduced by the fact that notional
principal amounts are not exchanged at maturity. Id. at
50.
109 See id at 49
110 See id at 62
51
requirements, participants in the OTC derivatives market
must adopt their own policies and procedures for managing
credit risk. 111 These policies and procedures generally
take the form of counterparty credit evaluation and the
use of risk limits for individual counterparties.
The October 1993 CFTC survey indicated that both dealers
and end-users evaluated the creditworthiness of
counterparties before engaging in any derivatives
transactions. All market participants that were
interviewed reported the use of standard credit ratings
obtained from a rating agency, such as Moody's or Standard
& Poors. Some participants, primarily dealers, reported
supplementing this evaluation with their own internal
rating.
All dealers and about half the end-users interviewed in
the CFTC study reported using some type of collateral to
reduce credit risk. Most participants that use collateral
arrangements require only lower credit rated
counterparties to post collateral at the inception of a
transaction. In other cases, collateral is required to be
posted only upon the happening of some pre-specif ied
111 CFTC, supra note 92, at 98-99
112 See id at 99
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event, such as a credit downgrading or the exceeding of a
pre-established obligation threshold. 113 To reduce
transaction costs, the adequacy of collateral obligations
in OTC derivatives is generally reviewed much less
frequently than the daily review and revision that occurs
in connection with exchange-traded derivatives. 114 In
addition, the pre - agreed thresholds that trigger
collateral payments are typically higher than in the
exchange-traded market. 115 Both of these transaction costs
"savings" devices impose other costs by increasing credit
risk.
D . Legal Risk
Legal risk is the risk of loss on a derivative because
the contract cannot be enforced. Unenforceability can be
caused by: insufficient documentation, insufficient
capacity or authority of a counterparty (ultra vires),
illegality of a contract, and bankruptcy or insolvency of
a counterparty. Although legal risk is present in all
financial activities, including traditional lending and
113 See CFTC, supra note 92, at 100
114 See GAO, supra note 91 at 4.
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trading activities, legal risk takes on added importance
in the context of derivatives transactions because they
are relatively novel, particularly in jurisdictions
outside of the United States. 116 OTC derivatives, in
particular, are subject to legal risk due to the lack of
exchange standardization of contracts and regulatory
review of their terms and conditions to which exchange-
traded derivatives are subject. 117 A major legal risk
faced by participants in the derivatives market is the
risk that a contract will be unenforceable because an
entire class of contracts is declared illegal or
unenforceable. This is a very real danger in cross-border
transactions where the legal status of the transaction in
the counterparty's home country is uncertain. 118 In the
United States, this risk has arisen primarily in
connection with the requirement in the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA) 119 that commodity futures contracts be exchange-
115 See id
116 See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 51.
117 CFTC, supra note 92, at 106. This is not to say,
however, that exchange-traded derivatives or other
regulated products do not suffer from legal risk, as
private litigants may challenge the legality of contracts
that have received regulatory approval. Id. at 106 n.89.
118 CFTC, supra note 92, at 106-07.
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traded. 12C This requirement does not extend to spot 121 or
forward contracts. 122 Because forwards and futures share
many similarities (the primary distinguishing features
being standardization and exchange trading) and because
the term commodity has been defined broadly in the
Commodity Exchange Act, 123 significant legal uncertainty
119
120
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994)
Section 6(a) of the CEA prohibits entrance into a
commodity futures contract except on or subject to the
rules of a CFTC-designated "contract market," unless a
section 6(c) exemption applies. 7 U.S.C. §6(a).
121 Spot transactions involve the current purchase or sale
of specific physical commodities.
122 The CFTC has jurisdiction over "contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery" (i.e., futures contracts),
7 U.S.C. § 2(i), but not the "sale of any cash commodity
for deferred shipment or delivery" (i.e., forward
contracts), 7 U.S.C. § la (11). Thus, forward transactions
are those in which delivery of the physical commodity is
contemplated and typically occurs, but is deferred until
some later time. The primary purpose of a futures
contract, by contrast, is to assume or shift risk without
transfer of the underlying commodity. Futures contracts,
therefore, typically provide for settlement by either
physical delivery or offset. Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v.
B.P. N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1489 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)
.
123 The CEA's definition of commodity includes virtually
all agricultural products and "all other goods and
articles ... and all services, rights and interests in
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in
the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C. § la (3).
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has arisen as to whether certain forward or option
products are actually illegal off-exchange futures
contracts
.
12A
In Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. B.P. North America
Petroleum, for example, the court held that the off-
exchange contracts in question, fifteen day forward
delivery contracts for Brent crude oil, were entered into
primarily for hedging purposes and not for the actual
future delivery of oil and were thus off-exchange futures
contracts. 125 Without intervention by the CFTC, losing
counterparties could have refused to perform their
obligations under the contracts, arguing instead that the
contracts were unenforceable, illegal off-exchange
commodity futures contracts. 126
In addition, the legality of swaps has been a matter of
some uncertainty in the United States. In an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued in 1987, the CFTC
124 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n. v. Co
Petro Mktg. Group, 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982).
125 Transnor, 738 F. Supp. at 1491. ("The high level of
speculation and performance without delivery, as well as
the relatively standardized contracts, distinguish the
15-day Brent transactions from the forward contracts
contemplated by the drafters of the Act.").
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questioned whether the relatively new U.S. commodity swap
market was an illegal off-exchange futures market, thus
driving commodity swap activity offshore. 12 This position
was reversed and clarified in a subsequent Policy
Statement. 128 With the passage of the Futures Trading
Practices Act of 1992, the CFTC was given authority in
section 6(c) of the CEA to exempt swaps from its
regulation. 129 In January 1993, the CFTC used this
authority to exempt qualifying swap agreements entered
into on or after October 23, 1974, from many provisions of
the CEA and the CFTC's regulations thereunder, including
the exchange-trading requirement, thus substantially
reducing the legal uncertainty surrounding swap
transactions with United States counterparties. 130
See CFTC Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward
Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,188 (1990) (stating that
15-day Brent oil contracts are forwards, not futures)
.
127 CFTC Regulation of Hybrid and Related Instruments, 52
Fed. Reg. 47,022, 47,022-23 (1987) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 34)
.
CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54
Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,694 (1989). The Policy Statement
expressed the CFTC's view that "most swap transactions,
although possessing elements of futures or options
contracts, are not appropriately regulated as such under
the Act, " thus creating a non-exclusive safe harbor for
most swaps.
129
7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994) .
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Legal risk can also arise from the possibility that a
counterparty will be declared legally incapable of
entering into a derivatives contract (ultra vires). During
the 1980s the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham
entered into several interest rate swaps that initially
earned outstanding returns. When interest rates moved
adversely, however, the borough suffered large losses. In
January 1991, the United Kingdom House of Lords held that
Hammersmith and Fulham lacked the necessary capacity to
enter into the trades to begin with and therefore was not
liable for payments due on the contracts, thus instantly
transferring more than $150 million in losses from the
seventy contracting municipalities to the dealers. 131
These losses represent approximately fifty percent of
total losses due to default on swaps since the inception
of swap transactions. 132
130 CFTC Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. pt . 35
(1995) . The new rules do not, however, provide an
exemption from certain antifraud and antimanipulation
provisions of the CEA. Id. at § 35.2.
131 Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council,
1 All ER 545, 554-55 (Ch. 1991) (Eng) ; G. Bruce Knecht,
The Lawyers' Turn; Derivatives Are Going Through Crucial
Test: A Wave of Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at
Al.
132 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 51.
E. Operational Risk
1
.
Measuring Operational Risk
Operational risk is the risk of loss occurring as a
result of inadequate systems and controls, human error, or
management failure. 133 Although operational risk is also
present in traditional trading and lending activities, the
complexity of many derivatives requires a special emphasis
on internal controls. Operational failure can increase
the other types of risks discussed so far. For example,
the failure to monitor and review trading activity to
ensure that counterparty credit limits or risk exposures
are not exceeded can increase credit and market risk,
respectively. 134
2. Controlling Operational Risk.
Numerous reports have been written advising derivatives
users of the need for and methods to control operational
133 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 50.
134 CFTC ^ supra note 92, at 110.
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risk. 135 These recommendations include oversight of
derivatives functions by informed and involved senior
management. Because derivatives transactions are often
more complex than are other financial transactions in
which the firm may engage, it is especially important that
management be well informed and knowledgeable about
derivatives activity. 136 The reports indicate that
management should ensure that sufficient resources are
available to support systems for data collection,
processing, settlement, and reporting to properly measure,
document, and control market and credit risk. 137
Operational duties should be segregated from the business
unit and an independent risk management unit should be
established. 138 Firms should document policies and
procedures, listing approved activities and establishing
limits and exceptions, and should establish internal
135 See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 50-51;
CFTC, supra note 92, at 110-12; Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve Sys
.
, SR-93-69, Examining Risk Management
and Internal Controls for Trading Activities of Banking
Organizations at 59-60 (Dec. 20, 1993); BASLE COMMITTEE,
supra note 106, at 16-18.
136 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 18.
137 Id. at 18; BASLE COMMITTEE, supra note 106, at 16.
138 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 50; BASLE COMMITTEE,
supra note 106, at 16.
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audits to verify compliance with such policies. 139 Proper
internal controls should be provided over the entry of
transactions into the database as well as over the
confirmation and settlement procedures. 140 Finally, the
reports urge firms to implement an internal system of
checks and balances over the entire process-from front
office trade initiation to back room settlement-to ensure
compliance with specified firm policies and procedures. 141
F. Liquidity risk
Liquidity risk is the risk that a party to an
instrument may not be able to transfer that instrument at
a reasonable price. 14 This risk applies more to over-the-
counter derivatives than to exchange traded instruments,
as the customized derivatives will be specifically
tailored to a certain party's needs. As with any other
139 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 50.
140 BASLE COMMITTEE, supra note 106, at 17.
141 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 50; BASLE COMMITTEE,
supra note 106, at 17.
142 E.g., Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating Derivatives:
Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable
Alternative to Congressional Action?
,
18 Fordham Int ' 1
L.J. 1397, 1417-18 (1995) (discussing systemic risk and
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type of asset, however, both customized and exchange-
traded derivatives can become illiquid if the value of the
derivative drops. Liquidity risk is related to credit
risk, and ultimately to systemic risk since the inability
of a counterparty to pay the obligations of the derivative
decreases the derivative's liquidity.
Users of derivative products face two types of liquidity
risk: product liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. 143
Product liquidity risk is the risk that a party will not
be able to easily unwind or hedge a particular position
because of inadequate market depth or breadth. 144 Funding
liquidity risk is the risk that a market participant will
be unable to meet its payment obligations on the
settlement date or in the event of a margin call. 145
The standardization of exchange-traded contracts leads
to greater fundability and, therefore, greater liquidity.
The use of clearinghouses, the anonymous nature of
exchange trading, and the relatively small contract size
all lead to a highly liquid exchange-traded derivatives
market that is different from the OTC market. In
its causes)
.
143 BASLE COMMITTEE, supra note 106, at 15.
144 See id
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addition, many standard form OTC derivatives contracts
allow counterparties to request collateral or require the
termination of the contract upon some triqgering event,
such as a deterioration in the financial condition or
creditworthiness of a party. 146 Such a call for collateral
or termination of the contract is likely to come at a time
when the party is already experiencing liquidity problems
from other sources. 14
6. Systemic Risk
The risk of greatest concern to many observers of
derivatives markets is systemic risk, the risk that a
disturbance will impair the efficient functioning of the
financial system and, at the extreme, cause its complete
breakdown. 148 Many argue that systemic risk arises from
the danger that the collapse of a single large dealer or
end-user could spread in a domino effect, causing serious
145 See id
146 BASLE COMMITTEE, supra note 106, at 15-16.
147 See id
148 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives
:
The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1466 (1993)
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repercussions for the entire global financial system.
Although governments are often unwilling to intervene to
prevent the failure of an individual market participant, 149
they generally have no choice when the financial system
itself is perceived to be threatened. 150
In September, 1998 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
helped organize the rescue of a large and prominent
speculative fund, indicating that regulators recognize
that the failure of such a fund would damage already
fragile world markets. Under the agreement the fund, Long-
Term Capital Management L.P. of Greenwich, Conn., received
a cash infusion of more than $3.5 billion from a
consortium of commercial banks and investment firms. 151 The
149 For example, the Bank of England refused to rescue
Barings from its 1995 derivatives loss after determining
that the bank's failure would not threaten the British or
international financial systems as a whole or cause severe
losses to small depositors. Paul Lewis, Acceptable
Failure Not Seen as Threat to Financial Systems, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995 at D8
.
150 The United States government took more drastic action
to avoid a perceived systemic crisis during the Savings
and Loan collapse. In 1989, Congress passed the largest
bailout in United States history, costing taxpayers a
total of $166 billion. Paulette Thomas, S&L Bailout Makes
Lawmakers a Bit Thriftier About Doling Out Help to Their
Constituents, WALL ST. J., Nov, 6, 1989, § 1, at 18.
151 Gretchen Morgenson, THE MARKETS; Seeing a Fund as Too
Big to Fail, New York Fed Assists Its Bailout, N.Y. Times,
September 24 at 1.
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deal came after representatives of 16 banks and brokerage
houses met at the offices of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York in downtown Manhattan. Regulators in the past
have encouraged creditors and borrowers to work together
to avoid the kind of panic selling of a portfolio that
could harm other investors in a particular market. For
example, during the downturn in real estate in the early
1990 's, the Fed asked banks to work with developers on the
ropes. After the stock market crash in 1987, the Fed made
capital available to securities firms that might have been
on shaky ground. 152
Although systemic risk has been cited as an issue with
respect to all financial markets, it has been of
particular concern with respect to the derivatives
markets, especially the OTC market. 153 The danger of a
systemic crisis in the OTC market is seen as more severe
than such a possibility in the exchange-traded market for
several reasons. First, the exchange-traded market is more
liquid than the OTC market. Second, the exchange-traded
market contains protections designed to isolate distress
152 Id
Derivative Financial Markets, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 42-46 (1993)
.
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within a market participant, such as the use of
clearinghouses that guarantee contract and the daily
marking-to-market of positions (both of which reduce
credit risk) . These protections are not present in the OTC
market. 154 Finally, regulation of the OTC derivatives
markets in the United States is spread among diverse
agencies primarily concerned with the integrity of the
individual participants or industries that fall within
their regulatory power not with the integrity of the OTC
derivatives market as a whole. It is argued that this
lack of oversight by a single market regulator contributes
to systemic risk, as fragmented oversight impedes the
regulatory coordination necessary to deal with a financial
crisis spanning firms, industries and, perhaps, national
boundaries
.
155
It is also argued that the high concentration of
derivatives activity contributes to systemic risk. Most
OTC derivatives activity in the United States is
concentrated among fifteen major United States dealers
154 CFTC ^ SUpra note 92, at 98-99. However, OTC market
participants have developed other mechanisms to control
credit risk and, in fact, credit losses have played a
relatively minor role in the OTC market.
Hearing, supra note 153, at 43 n.12. Others argue that
consolidating regulatory authority in a single regulator
increases, rather than decreases, systemic risk.
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that are extensively linked to one another, to end-users,
and to other markets. 150 At year-end 1992, for example,
the top seven domestic bank OTC derivatives dealers
accounted for over ninety percent of total U.S. bank
derivatives activity, and the GAO indicated in its 1996
report that this trend toward concentration in the major
bank dealers had continued. 15 ' Similarly, the top five
U.S. securities firms dealing in OTC derivatives accounted
for over ninety percent of total derivatives activity for
all U.S. securities firms, 158 and the three insurance
companies completing the list of the top fifteen U.S. OTC
derivatives dealers were the only insurance companies GAO
could identify as derivatives dealers. 15E It is believed
by some (especially after the Long-Term Capital Management
156 See GAO, supra note 91, at 7. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES-ACTIONS TAKEN OR PROPOSED
SINCE MAY 1994 (1996), available at 1994 WL 660583, at 3
[hereinafter GAO II]
.
157 GAO, supra note 91, at 6; GAO II supra note 154, at 30.
158 GAO II, supra note 156, at 7.
159 The Group of Thirty's 1993 report found that the top
eight dealers accounted for 58% of the interest rate and
currency swap markets at year-end 1991. GROUP OF THIRTY,
supra note 7, at 61. Surprisingly, the Group of Thirty
presents this statistic as evidence against the existence
of market concentration, a conclusion not shared by most
market observers. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 91, at 6-7
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bailout by the Fed's) that this combination of market
concentration and linkages across firms and markets means
that the sudden failure of one large market participant
could have systemic consequences and lead to the failure
of other market participants, including insured depositary
institutions
.
160
Even the Group of Thirty, noting the lack of financial
disclosure by derivatives users, acknowledges that
financial accounting and reporting standards and
requirements have failed to keep pace with developments in
the derivatives market. 161 Lack of transparency of this
type makes it difficult to assess risk distribution and,
therefore, hampers counterparties' attempts to monitor
credit risk. 162 Nearly every study undertaken of the
derivatives market has urged the adoption of new
accounting standards to deal with the unique problems
presented by the financial reporting of derivatives
160 See GAO, supra note 91, at 7.
161 GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 62. The Group of
Thirty report is well known for its favorable portrayal of
the derivatives market.
162Bank Of International Settlements, Recent Developments
in International Interbank Relations, Report of working
group established by the central banks of the group of
ten countries
.
(1992
)
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transactions. 163 The Financial Accounting Standards Board
and the SEC have made progress in correcting these
deficiencies. However, recent studies indicate that
significant accounting and disclosure problems still exist
with respect to derivatives transactions. 164
Market linkages are also a factor cited as contributing
to systemic risk in the derivatives markets. Because the
derivatives market is global in nature, it links United
States financial markets closely with foreign ones. A
disruption outside the United States arguably could have
drastic and far-ranging effects in this country. The
derivatives market is also linked to the underlying
market. For example, a disruption in the stock index
futures market clearly has an affect on the stock spot
market and vice-versa. 165 Finally, OTC derivatives dealers
also tend to be active participants in the other financial
markets, such as banking, lending, futures, or stock, so
163 See, e.g., GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 7, at 62;
Hearing, supra note 153; GAO, supra note 91, at 128.
164 See GAO II, supra note 156, at 82.
It is clear, for example, that derivatives trading
played a role in the 1987 stock market crash. On October
19, 1987, about nine percent of New York Stock Exchange
trading was due to index arbitrage and 12-24% of total
trading in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's S&P 500 stock
index futures contract was due to portfolio insurance
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that the failure of a financial institution due to
derivatives trading could have systemic and liquidity
repercussions in the other markets as well. 166
trading (i.e., derivative trading). Hearing, supra note
153, at 35.
166 See CFTC, supra note 92, at 121; GAO, supra note 91, at
CHAPTER III: CASE ANALYSIS OF RECENT DERIVATIVE LOSSES
In the last chapter we have seen that the risks
associated with derivatives need to be managed or losses
are inevitable. Now in this chapter we will look at
concrete examples of derivative losses, which have
occurred, in the recent past.
The most publicized corporate losses due to derivatives
include transactions between BT Securities (the securities
affiliate of Bankers Trust) and two companies, Gibson
greeting cards and Procter and Gamble. BT Securities did
not escape prosecution, which proved to some that actions
for common-law fraud already exists. 16 ' Moreover, those
accountable for the debacle also faced the consequences of
their irresponsibility, as one BT executive was fined for
BT's derivatives trading. 168
167 Judge Feikens of Ohio's Southern District held that the
common law fraud claim against BT could stand. Swaps
Defended, Wall St. J., May 17, 1996, at A14.
168 Laurie Hays, Ex-Bankers Trust Official is Fined in
Derivatives Case, Wall St. J., June 12, 1996, at C20.
70
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A. BT Securities and Gibson Greetings
Gibson began its derivatives exposure with BT on
November 12, 1991. Gibson and BT entered into an interest
rate swap, which Gibson hoped would reduce the interest
expenses it was sustaining on a liability of $50 million
on which it was paying 9.33% interest. 165 The swap would
have allowed Gibson a notional amount of $30 million on
which Gibson would pay BT a fixed rate of 5.91%. The
fixed rate payments would begin on June 1, 1992 and
continuing semi-annually until December 1, 1996, when
Gibson would make the last payment. BT simultaneously
would pay Gibson the 6 month LIBOR of $30 million. BT and
Gibson entered into a second swap on a notional amount of
$30 million beginning on June 1, 1992. Gibson would pay
BT the LIBOR every six months, while BT would pay 7.12% of
$30 million to Gibson.
In the first half of 1992, interest rates fell so that
Gibson's payments to BT were less than the payments BT had
to make to Gibson under the contract. BT and Gibson
amended these derivatives in January 1992 and canceled
169 James Overdahl & Barry Schacter, Derivatives Regulation
and Financial Management: Lessons from Gibson Greetings,
Fin. Mgmt., Spring 1995, at 68.
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them on July 7, 1992 with the net effect that BT paid
Gibson $260,000 as a settlement reflecting the decrease in
interest rates. 170 Gibson was concerned with its original
$50 million liability on which it paid 9.33%. Concerned
that the market interest rate would be lower (for our
purposes, LIBOR), Gibson would have preferred to pay the
market rate. Taken in the aggregate, the first two swaps
entered into with BT were a bet that the market interest
rate would decrease.
Pleased with this result, Gibson entered into a ratio
swap, akin to an interest rate swap in that Gibson's
payments would have depended on a floating interest rate.
The parties entered this ratio swap on October 1, 1992 to
begin on April 5, 1993 and continue semi-annually on
October 5 and again on April 5 of the following year.
Until the termination date of October 5, 1997, BT was to
pay Gibson a fixed rate of 5.50% of $30 million while
Gibson was to pay BT on the notional amount of $30 million
multiplied by LIBOR squared over 6%: 171 Gibson's exposure
to an increase in the LIBOR rate exponentially increases
under this swap.
170
Id. at 69.
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Neither of the above transactions continued until their
scheduled maturities. 17 '' The ratio swap outlined above was
canceled in exchange for BT paying $978,000 and entering
into another swap. 17 " This process of canceling swaps and
entering into new ones involved a "tear-up" 174 amount which
projected the amount that would have been earned by one of
the counterparties. Thus, if Gibson stood to make $10,000
upon the natural termination of the swap, this amount
would allegedly be factored into the newly entered swap.
When Gibson entered into these new swaps, it relied
heavily on the valuation BT presented. Essentially, BT
would value the existing swaps to determine the "tear up"
value. Gibson's complaints centered around BT ' s valuation.
Once Gibson began suffering staggering losses, it alleged
that it had been misled by the financial modeling
presented by BT. 17 " Gibson claimed that BT owed Gibson a
duty not to mislead. 176 Conversely, BT pointed out that
the agreements entered into did not delineate any
171 Id. at 76.
172
Id.
173 Id. at 70
174 Id
175 Id
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fiduciary duty. 17 ' BT argued further that the transactions
were at arm's length and that the valuations presented
were meant as contractual terms: conditions under which BT
would enter into new swaps.
The SEC found BT violated of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, 178 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 17 ' and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 180 In particular, the
conversation between a BT managing director and his
supervisor evidenced fraud 181 under provisions already
written into securities laws.
This dispute eventually ended in a settlement on
November 23, 1994, in which BT forgave $14 million of the
176 Id
177
Id. at 70-71.
178 15 U.S.C. § 77 (q) (1997) .
179 15 U.S.C. 78 (j) (1997) .
180 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). See also In re BT Sec.
Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 85,477 (1995).
181 Id. P 86,114. The managing director told his
supervisor that:
From the very beginning, [Gibson] just, you know,
really put themselves in our hands like 96%... And we
have known that from day one... these guys [Gibson]
have done some pretty wild stuff. And you know, they
probably do not understand it quite as well as they
should. I think that they have a pretty good
understanding of it, but not perfect. And that's like
perfect for us .
"
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$20.2 million, which Gibson owed. 182 The SEC and the CFTC
also brought actions. A BT broker faced charges which
ended in a $50,000 fine and a four-year ban from the
securities profession for understating to Gibson the
losses actually suffered, which understatement resulted in
Gibson's inaccurate release of financial statements. 18 '
B . BT Securities and Procter & Gamble
In a similar charge, P&G alleged that BT traders
deceived it by presenting certain financial modeling which
hid risks and which led to losses of up to $157 million
before taxes. 184 These losses were the amount P&G owed BT
under two swaps.
P&G had swapped much of its fixed income debt for a
floating interest rate debt in order to take advantage of
what it had hoped would be falling interest rates.
Expecting the slide in interest rates to continue, P&G
approached BT suggesting a swap transaction whereby P&G
182 Richard Waters, US Bank Settles Derivatives Law Suit,
Fin. Times, Nov. 24, 1994, at 30.
183 Former Bankers Trust Broker Settles Charges Involving
Derivatives, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1996, at B12.
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would benefit so long as interest rates did not rise.
After refusing several of the transactions proposed by BT,
P&G settled upon a transaction with BT in November 1993 185
whereby, on a notional amount of $200 million, "P&G was to
pay a floating rate 75 basis points below commercial paper
rates" for the first six months. 186 Following this, P&G
was required to pay a floating rate "dictated by a brain
twisting formula whose components would include five-year
and 30-year Treasury rates as of May 4, 1994. " 187 The
effect of this transaction was that P&G would benefit if
interest rates were lower because it was being paid a
fixed rate, yet if interest rates rose, it would suffer.
When interest rates did rise, P&G sued BT. Before the
suit, P&G and BT had entered into another transaction more
complex than the first. The formula agreed upon
essentially included a band with boundaries of 4.5% and
6.10%. P&G stood to win so long as interest rates
remained within this band. However, interest rates
increased beyond this band. Acting on an alleged promise
184 Carol Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, Fortune,
Mar. 20, 1995, at 62.
185 Id. at 64.
186 Id at 62.
187 Id.
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from BT, P&G tried to avoid this rise in interest rates by
negotiating to lock in the rate which it would pay to BT
.
Eventually, BT and P&G settled upon a rate, but not before
P&G suffered great losses.
Procter & Gamble sought declaratory relief and
damages with respect to two interest rate swap
transactions for which Bankers Trust, the derivatives
dealers, claimed it was owed $200 million. 188 Procter &
Gamble challenged the legal enforceability of the two
derivatives trades. 189 The core of Procter & Gamble's
legal action against Bankers Trust was a common-law fraud
count based on failure to disclose material information
concerning the risks associated with the swap trades. 190
Procter & Gamble alleged a number of other counts,
including an allegation that Bankers Trust owed and
breached a fiduciary duty to Procter & Gamble because it
failed to disclose risks associated with the derivatives
transactions. 1 1
188 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996;
189 See id at 1289-90
190 Id.
191
Id,
The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio dismissed all of the counts, except for
the fraud count. 192 The court found that no fiduciary
relationship existed between Procter & Gamble and Bankers
Trust, finding instead that both parties were principals
in the derivatives transaction. 193 The court held that
Procter & Gamble could proceed on its fraud claim. 194 The
court found that under New York law, the agreement between
the parties contained an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing that imposed upon Bankers Trust a duty to
disclose material information concerning risks associated
with the derivatives trades. 195 Procter & Gamble never
proceeded on the fraud claim because Bankers Trust settled
the legal action by agreeing to receive a reduced amount
of $35 million from Procter & Gamble for the obligation it
owed on the two disputed swap agreements. 196
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 1289-91.
196 See Denis Forster, Derivatives Law in the Aftermath of
Procter & Gamble v. Bankers Trust, Derivatives Litig.
Rep., Sept. 16, 1996, at 3.
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Absent the parties' settlement, the court's opinion
would have allowed Procter & Gamble to establish a common-
law fraud case based on a breach of a duty to disclose
material information. The court's holding in this case
suggests that while derivatives dealers may not owe a
fiduciary duty to end-users, the dealers may have a duty
to disclose material information regarding risks
associated with the derivatives trades. Failure to
disclose such information may constitute fraud.
C . Orange County Bankruptcy.
Orange County is the largest municipality in U.S.
history to go bankrupt. 19 ' Robert Citron, treasurer of
Orange County, ran the Orange County Investment Pool
(hereinafter "OPIC") . The pool consisted of 187 public
entities such as cities, school districts, sanitation
districts, and water authorities. 198 Citron made many of
197 See Phillippe Jorion, Big Bets Gone Bad, 1 (1995
198 Id. at 7
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his investments with the securities firm of Merrill
Lynch. 19 " Naturally, as the county realized losses, it
began to point fingers at Merrill Lynch.
Citron thought that interest rates would fall. He
entered into what are known as inverse floaters,
investment instruments which result in coupon payments
based on the direction of interest rates/ 00 Typically,
these instruments are hedging devices that an investor
would use if he had had too many transactions dependent
upon high interest rates.
Citron decided to use them as an investment vehicle,
betting on stable or falling interest rates. 201 These
inverse floaters were structured notes which had become
popular in the last few years, especially in 1993, when
investors sought highly bullish investments/ 1 For
example, Citron invested $100 million in a structured note
issued by the Federal Home Loan Board which was structured
199 Id. at 98.
200 This bet on future interest rates is very similar to a
swap transaction where the counterparties are predicting
the future of interest rates.
201 Jorion, supra note 188, at 77
202Lauries Goodman & Linda Lowell, Structured Note
Alternatives to Fixed Rate and Floating Rate CMOs, 1
Derivatives Q., Spring 1995, at 67.
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so that it would pay 15.5% less twice the LIBOR
rate : 15 . 5%-2 (LIBOR) In this calculation, an increase in
the LIBOR had a doubling effect. If the rate went up by
1%, Orange County would feel the pinch of a 2% decrease in
payments received. 203 Unfortunately for OPIC and Citron,
interest rates increased.
The reason that Orange County declared bankruptcy when
it did was because it did not meet its margin call
requirements. 204 At the time of the margin call, Orange
County had $800 million in cash, $5 billion in securities,
as well as real estate tax revenues. More importantly, if
these margin requirements were met and Orange County
decided to ride out the storm, the county stood to recover
the $21 billion value of its portfolio along with $300
million in interest. County residents would have made a
profit. 205
203 Jorion, supra note 188, at 51
204 Id. at 9
205 Andy Pasztor & Bruce Orwall, SEC Accused Orange County
of Fraud, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at B5
.
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D . Reasons for These Losses
The losses incurred by Gibson, P&G, and Orange County
were not the result of derivatives themselves, but were
the result of the failure to understand, evaluate, and
properly hedge market risk, coupled with old fashioned
greed and fraud. All three parties had taken highly
leveraged, unhedged positions based on views that interest
rates would fall or remain stable, subjecting themselves
to theoretically unlimited losses if interest rates
instead rose. When interest rates did rise in early 1994,
each party suffered immediate and significant declines in
portfolio value due to the high interest rate sensitivity
of the investments they had created. In short, each party
severely miscalculated volatility risk by assuming stable
future interest rates, an assumption that proved to be
misguided as interest rates moved sharply upward. 206
206 With respect to the reverse repos in the Orange County
portfolio, Citron may have evaluated the contracts by
comparing the cost of carry (the repo rate) and the
convenience yield (the expected yield on the inverse
floaters) and concluded that the market would never reach
interest rate levels that jeopardized the
investments. Unfortunately for Citron, the market did
reach such levels and as interest rates rose, his cost of
carry far exceeded his convenience yield, resulting in a
loss. Stan Jonas, A Roundtable on Orange County,
DERIVATIVES STRATEGY, Jan. 2, 1995, Vol.4, No.l, at 7.
There is no reason why these parties should not have
understood the risks involved in their contracts, though
all now claim a lack of such understanding. 207 While
determining the price and yields of OTC derivatives is
certainly more complex than making such determinations
with respect to traditional securities and lending
activities, anyone familiar with investment strategy
(including the treasury department at any large United
States corporation or municipal investment fund) should
have no trouble understanding that a highly leveraged,
unhedged, one-sided investment strategy presents both the
possibility of great gains if the investor's expectations
of future market conditions are correct, and the
possibility of great losses if those expectations prove to
be wrong.
While Gibson's assertions of unsophistication may be
true (and the company certainly was not aided by BT ' s
fraud and misrepresentations) , such a situation never
should have been allowed to develop. P&G was apparently
quite familiar with derivatives (particularly interest
rate derivatives) and had profitably used such contracts
in the past. Robert Citron, the Orange County Treasurer,
was by all accounts an extremely knowledgeable and
sophisticated investor who, due to his phenomenally high
returns, was considered a "financial guru" by the many
investors who poured money into the Orange County-managed
funds. Nell Henderson & Brett D. Fromson, Merrill Lynch:
The Broker Behind Orange County, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,
1994, at Fl.
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It is also important to understand the role that
leverages played in each of these transactions. Gibson,
P&G, and Orange County all had constructed highly
leveraged portfolios that greatly magnified any changes in
underlying value. Gibson, for example, was first informed
by BT on February 25, 1994, that its open swap positions
had a negative net value of $8 million. By the next
business day, February 28, 1994, BT informed Gibson that
its losses stood at $13.4 million. Three days later, on
March 3, 1994, Gibson was told that it owed BT $17.5
million under the swap contracts. 208 Such rapid price
movements can impose substantial losses before the
investor is able to unwind a complex portfolio.
208 Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., No.
C-l-94-620, at 13-14 1 27 (S.D. Ohio, filed Sept. 12,
1994) (Complaint and Jury Demand). It is hard to evaluate
the true elasticity of Gibson's portfolio because BT
purposely misled Gibson about its losses. One taped
telephone conversation revealed the manner in which BT did
this: "I think that we should use this [downward market
price movement] as an opportunity. We should just call
[the Gibson contact]
,
and maybe chip away at the
differential a little more. I mean we told him $8.1
million when the real number was 14. So now if the real
number is 16, we'll tell him that it is 11. You know, just
slowly chip away at the differential between what it
really is and what we're telling him." BT Sec. Corp.,
Securities Act Release No. 7124 [1994-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,477, at 86,111 (Dec.
22, 1994)
.
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Market observers should recognize that incidents such as
these could not have taken place in the exchange-traded
derivative market. First, no counterparty to an exchange-
traded derivative contract could argue that it was unable
to value the contract. By definition, the market performs
this pricing function for the parties, resulting in much
greater price transparency. Second, hidden losses such as
those concealed by BT from Gibson (and those concealed by
Citron from his investors) are not possible on the
exchanges, as the automatic marking-to-market on all
exchanges makes investor gains and losses immediately
apparent. End-users who want the custom-tailoring of risk
and rewards available in the OTC market should recognize
that such flexibility comes at a price: the OTC market is
less price transparent, less liquid, and requires greater
knowledge and sophistication on the part of end-users than
does the exchange-traded market.
Finally, Gibson, P&G, and Orange County each failed to
follow recommended procedures for managing market risk.
Apparently none used scenario analyses to evaluate market
risk relative to pre-defined limits. These scenario
analyses should have included both investor forecasts of
future market movements and assumptions of nonstandard
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conditions, such as unexpectedly large underlying
volatility. If they had performed such stress tests, each
party would have been aware of its possible losses in the
event of interest rate increases. In addition, it is
evident that these end-users were not marking-to-market on
a regular basis. 21 If Gibson had performed this basic
function, which is recommended for all end-users, then it
could not have been so easily misled by BT. Furthermore,
it does not appear that Gibson, P&G, or Orange County used
any standard procedure for offsetting market risk.
Instead, each took highly leveraged, unhedged positions
based on an assumption of stable interest rates. It is not
surprising, therefore, that these investors suffered large
losses when that assumption later proved to be misguided.
209 According to BT, P&G admitted to this complete
breakdown in risk assessment and risk management
procedures. P&G's CEO allegedly told the board of
directors that P&G's treasurer "simply went to sleep ...
[and] ... ignored the risk assessment." P&G's CFO further
informed the board that the treasury department "didn't
test any 'worst case' scenarios to see what would happen
if interest rates took off on us" and that treasury
personnel failed to conduct probability analyses and had
"chosen to take a less scientific path to valuation."
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. C-l-94-735,
at 19 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (Memorandum of BT in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint).
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E . Barrings Bank Case
On February 26, 1995, Barings, one of Britain's oldest
and most prestigious merchant banks, collapsed due to
losses of over $1 billion by 28-year-old trader Nicholas
Leeson. 210 Before his losses came to the attention of
Barings management, Leeson had bought $7 billion worth of
stock-index futures and sold $20 billion worth of bond and
interest rate futures. 211 Most of Baring's losses arose
from the stock index futures. 212 There is some dispute as
to the trading strategy that ultimately caused the losses.
The Bank of England (the chief banking regulatory body in
England) reports that although Leeson was supposed to be
engaged in a simple arbitrage strategy, seeking to profit
from pricing inefficiencies between the prices of
Nikkei-225 futures contracts listed on the Osaka
Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX) , he had in fact abandoned this strategy
to place unhedged positions, speculating on the future
210 The Collapse of Barings: A Fallen Star, THE ECONOMIST,
March 4, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter The Collapse of
Barings]
.
211 The Collapse of Barings, supra note 202, at 19-21.
212
. Id. at 19-.
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direction of Nikkei movement
.
a
"' Sources within Barings
itself, however, indicate that Leeson was engaging in
short "straddles" that would pay off only if the Nikkei
stayed within the 18,500 to 19,500 range. 214 When the Kobe
earthquake hit on January 17, 1995, the Japanese stock
market fell and Leeson suffered substantial losses. Leeson
dramatically increased the size of his trades, either in
an attempt to recoup losses or push up the market through
his trading." 15 When the Tokyo market plunged one thousand
points on January 23, Leeson continued to increase
dramatically the size of his trades, until his losses were
eventually discovered and he fled Singapore sometime
around February 26, 1995. 216
213 The Collapse of Barings, supra note 202, at 19. True
arbitrage, such as that in which Leeson supposedly
engaged, is a risk-free investment because a position in
one market is always offset by a perfect opposing position
in another market. The idea is to profit from any pricing
inefficiencies between the two markets. Because such
pricing differences are typically minuscule, the trading
volume of an arbitrager tends to be very large.
214 Id. Leeson sold 40,000 such contracts for Barings,
earning the bank a profit of $150 million in 1994. Id. A
long straddle is the purchase of a put option and a call
option on the same underlying with the same strike price
and same maturity.
215 The Collapse of Barings, supra note 223, at 19.
216 Id.
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The Barrings incident is a classic case of operational
failure. Simple internal controls at even one of several
levels could have easily prevented such a catastrophe.
First, Leeson was head of both settlements and trading,
even though it is considered improper practice to have one
person in charge of both functions. 217 Allowing a trader
to settle his own trades makes it easier for him to hide
both his losses and his risk exposure. Leeson ' s dual role
allowed him easily to deceive Barrings internal auditors,
who examined Leeson 's office three times in the twelve
months before the bank collapsed." 1 Leeson simply forged
documents indicating that he was offsetting his futures
positions with OTC contracts purchased through a Bermuda-
based hedge fund and created a fictitious client account
to hide his losses." ' In addition, Barings lacked an
independent risk management unit to monitor Leeson 's
217 The Collapse of Barings, supra note 223, at 20. In
fact, Barings' internal auditors issued a 24 page report
in August 1994, detailing the significant risk associated
with Leeson' s role as head of both trading and
settlements. Bank Warning Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1995, at D15. Barings' management apparently ignored the
warning.
218 The Collapse of Barings, supra note 202, at 20
219 Id
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positions. 2- Finally, Barings seems to have been blinded
by Leeson's astronomical profits. Bank officials reported
that no suspicions were raised and that Leeson continued
to enjoy a reputation as a conservative trader within the
bank, long after traders at rival firms had noticed the
growth of Barings' positions and its risky, aggressive
trading strategy. 221
The total breakdown in operational controls can be seen
clearly in the context of Leeson's margin calls. Because
all of Leeson's contracts were exchange-traded, the firm
had to put up initial margin and meet calls as the firm's
account lost value. As Leeson's losses mounted, these
calls must have been substantial, yet no eyebrows were
raised at Barings for several reasons. First, the cash
required to pay the margin calls did not exceed the bank's
limits until February 23, when the losses were far greater
than what the bank could absorb, indicating an incredible
lapse in the establishment of the firm's risk limits."'
Second, Leeson had set up a fictitious client account into
220 Id.
Id. By the time Leeson's losses were finally
discovered, Barings ' exposure on the OSE was eight times
the size of its nearest rival's and was even greater on
the SIMEX. Id.
22; See The Collapse of Barings, supra note 202, at 20.
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which he had funneled Barings ' money and out of which he
paid margin calls."' When this account was exhausted,
Leeson reguested money from Barings in London, which
readily extended the credit because the "client" had so
far provided the bank with such large commissions.''24
The Barings incident was also provoked by the lack of
proper oversight by the exchanges. Neither the Japanese
nor the Singapore markets determined the cause of Barings'
increasingly large positions. Although inguiries were
apparently made, Leeson, as the Barings representative,
was able to respond by merely supplying a few fictitious
client names. 225 In addition, the situation perhaps could
have been detected before reaching crisis proportions if
the exchanges had done a better job of information
r.u^~l „„ 226sharing.
Although many have tried to blame the Barings collapse
on derivatives, Leeson' s losses had nothing to do with the
contracts being traded and everything to do with a lack of
internal controls. The typical reasons asserted for the
223 Id
224 Id
225 Id. at 21
226 Id
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need for greater regulation of derivatives-lack of
regulatory oversight for OTC derivatives and the
complexity and sophistication of some derivatives
instruments which makes them impossible for all but
experts to understand-do not apply at all to Barings. 22_7
Leeson's losses resulted from transactions in simple
exchange-traded options and futures-products that have
been in existence for decades and are (or should be)
easily understood by anyone connected with the financial
industry.
227 Id
CHAPTER IV: DERIVATIVES REGULATION
A. Introduction
The extent to which derivatives dealers are subject
tc regulation depends on the type of derivatives
instrument they are trading. Derivatives dealers trading
exchange-listed and OTC derivatives instruments involving
securities are subject to the regulatory authority of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" ) ."' Dealers
trading exchange-listed derivatives instruments involving
commodities, such as futures and commodities options, are
subject to the regulatory authority of the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission.'' 29 Derivatives dealers trading
OTC derivatives involving commodities such as forwards are
not subject to the regulatory authority of the CFTC.
See supra note 92 at 3A-3
225 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supra note 92, at 3A-
i.
230 See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ la(ll), 2a(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
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Derivatives dealers trading swap agreements with certain
institutional investors are exempt from all but the anti-
fraud provisions of the CFTC laws. 231
Additionally, banks acting as derivatives dealers
trading OTC derivatives instruments are subject to certain
banking regulation concerning derivatives trading.
National banks acting as derivatives dealers are subject
to the regulatory authority of Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency ("OCC")- 232 State member banks acting as
derivatives dealers are subject to the Fed.'s authority,
while state nonmember banks are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") . 233
B . SEC Regulatory Regime
The SEC has regulatory authority over exchange-traded
derivatives transactions that consist of options on
individual securities, options on certificates of deposit,
231 See 17 C.F.R. § 35.2 (1997)
232 See GAO, supra note 5, at 70
233 See id
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and options on stock indices. 234 The SEC also has
jurisdiction over OTC derivatives contracts involving
securities.^ 35 Absent an exemption, the federal securities
laws require broker-dealers, including those who engage in
derivatives transactions involving securities, to register
as broker-dealers with the Commission. 230 The federal
securities laws also require registered broker-dealers to
become a member of one or more SRO, such as NASD, the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), and the other national
exchanges that trade derivatives. 237
Pursuant to an exemptive order, the SEC temporarily
exempted broker-dealers engaged in trading certain swap
agreements involving OTC options from the registration
provisions of the securities laws. 238 The order, which
234 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(a)(l), 78c(a)(10) (West 1997).
235 See id.
236 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 o(a) (West 1997). Registration
requires broker-dealers to disclose the nature of their
business and principal officers.
237 See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation
503 (1996).
See Order Exempting Certain Brokers and Dealers from
Broker-Dealer Registration, Exchange Act Release No.
35,135, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 85,476, at 86,107 (Dec. 22, 1994) (temporarily
exempting broker-dealers trading certain OTC derivatives
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expired in September 1995, exempted broker-dealers trading
certain swap agreements from registering with the SEC
during the exemptive period. 239 The SEC issued the
exemptive order after its administrative proceeding
against BT Securities Corporation in which the SEC found
that certain Treasury-linked swap agreements were cash-
settled options contracts subject to the regulatory
authority of the SEC. 240 The SEC exempted those
derivatives dealers trading swap agreements with embedded
options on debt securities to provide them with adequate
time to transfer such transactions from their unregulated
affiliates to their regulated broker-dealer parents'
balance sheets. 241 Broker-dealers trading OTC derivatives
not involving securities transact these trades through
their unregistered affiliates to avoid the reporting and
capital requirements to which registered broker-dealers
are subject. Even though these broker-dealers are not
subject to the registration provisions of the security
from registration requirements under section 15(a) of the
Exchange Act) [hereinafter SEC Exemptive Order].
239 See id.
240 See In re BT Securities Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
35,136, [1994- 1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 85,477, at 86,109 (Dec. 22, 1994).
241 See SEC Exemptive Order, supra note 237, at 86,10:
97
laws, the SEC oversees their derivatives activity pursuant
to regulatory authority granted the SEC by the Market
Reform Act of 1990 ("MRA"). 242 Under the MRA, the SEC has
the authority to obtain from unregistered affiliates
certain information about their derivatives activity,
including those derivatives transactions that do not
involve securities. 243 Pursuant to the MRA, the SEC
adopted rules establishing a risk-assessment program that
reguires the largest broker-dealers to establish record-
keeping and reporting reguirements regarding any
affiliate's financial condition that may have a material
impact on the broker-dealer. 244 Unregistered affiliates
must also provide the SEC with guarterly reports on
derivatives positions and details on the internal controls
and risk management implemented by the affiliate. 245
In January 1997 the Commission amended Regulations S-X
and S-K to reguire disclosures by registrants of policies
they use to account for derivatives, as well as certain
242 See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (West 1997
243 See id.
244 See Risk Assessment Reporting Reguirements for Brokers
and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240 . 17h-2T (c) (1997).
245 c^^ -; ^iSee id.
98
quantitative and qualitative information about market risk
exposure. The amendments to Regulation S-X are effective
for the financial statements of banks and thrifts and of
all companies with market capitalization of more than $2.5
billion for years ending after June 15, 1997 . Disclosures
are required for all other registrants for year-ends after
June 15, 1998. 246
The SEC concluded that additional disclosure was
required in three areas:
A. Enhanced description of accounting policies used to
account for derivative financial and commodity
instruments
.
B. Disclosure of quantitative information on market risk
for derivatives and other financial instruments.
C. Disclosure of qualitative information on market risk for
derivative and other financial instruments, including
primary market-risk exposures and strategy for managing
exposures. 247
246 Allen I. Young, Disclosures Of, and Accounting for,
Derivative Financial Instruments, 1092 PLI/Corp 53(1999).
See id
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The amendments identify the following as matters that
must be disclosed in the accounting policies footnote
tothe financial statements with respect to the derivative
financial and commodity instruments covered:
A. Methods used to account for derivatives;
B. Types of derivatives used under each method;
C. Required criteria for each method;
D. Accounting methods used if specific criteria are not
met;
E. Accounting for termination of derivatives designated as
hedges;
F. Accounting for derivatives if the hedged item matures
or is sold; and
G. Where and when derivative gains and losses are reported
in the registrant's financial statements/ 48
The new Rule also requires both qualitative and
quantitative disclosure of market risk for all market-
risk-sensitive instruments. Qualitative disclosures, which
are to appear in the filing document outside of the
financial statements, include:
248 See id at 2
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A. The nature of primary market-risk exposures at period
end;
B. How exposures are managed, including strategy,
instruments and objectives;
C. Material changes in primary exposures and how managed;
and
D. Qualitative disclosure information about all
instruments entered into for trading purposes. 249
Quantitative disclosures of market risks, which are to
appear in the filing document outside of the financial
statements, may take one of three forms:
A. Tabular presentation;
B. Sensitivity analysis; or
C. Value-at-risk. 250
C . Changes in Accounting Standards
In June 1998 the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) issued its long-awaited Standard (FAS 133) which
provides guidance on accounting for derivative instruments
and hedging activities. While the Standard is very
249 See id
250 See id
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complex, its objective is to simplify financial reporting
of derivatives in order to insure consistency in the
accounting for these instruments by the many entities that
hold derivatives for many different reasons. Simply put,
all derivatives must be carried on a company's balance
sheet at fair value, and changes in that fair value must
be recognized in income when they occur, unless the
instrument qualifies as a hedge. There are three types of
derivatives that qualify as hedges so that changes in
their fair value are not recognized in income as they
occur: (i) fair-value hedges; (ii) cash-flow hedges, and
(iii) foreign-currency hedges. 251
FAS 133 is effective for all fiscal years beginning
after June 15, 1999. (This effective date has been delayed
for a year. 252 )
A. Upon adoption, all derivatives must be recognized on
the balance sheet at their then fair value.
B. All hedging relationships must be designated as such
and appropriately documented.
251 See Young, supra note 247 at 3.
252 See WWW. isda . org/a55 99 . 2html . (International Swap
Dealers Association News Release May 19,1999.)
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C. Any SEC-registrant which does not adopt FAS 133
immediately must disclose certain information in footnotes
to its financial statement pursuant to SAB 74.
(1) The footnotes must contain a brief description of FAS
133, the date by which adoption is required and the
date the entity plans to adopt the standard, if earlier
than the required date.
(2) In addition, the footnote must discuss (a) the methods
of adoption permitted by FAS 133 and the method
expected to be adopted by the company, (b) the impact
that such adoption is expected to have on the financial
statements of the company, (c) the potential impact on
the company from the adoption of FAS 133, in addition
to its effect on the balance sheet and income
statements, including possible violations of debt
covenants or changes in business practices
.
i53
D . The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Unlike the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the OCC does not,
and has no latent authority to, regulate any part of the
253 See id.
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derivatives market. 254 The OCC does supervise banks who
are major participants in the derivatives markets, both as
dealers, intermediaries, and end-users. Their primary
supervisory concern is that banks conduct their activities
in a safe and sound manner. They have focused on risk, and
in particular on the accurate identification and
measurement, and the prudent monitoring and control of the
various risks associated with derivatives products. 25 '
The OCC explains how national banks should manage the
risks associated with derivatives and mortgage backed
securities transactions for all their fiduciary
accounts. 256 The guidelines are part of the agency's
overall "supervision by risk" policy that looks at the
254 Douglas E. Harris, Senior Deputy Comptroller for
Capital Markets, Remarks Before the End-Users of
Derivatives Association, Second Annual Conference and
Member Meeting, Washington D.C. (Apr. 10, 1996), in O.C.C.
News Release 96-41, Apr. 10, 1996, at 6. [hereinafter OCC
Bulletin 96-25] ; see also Derivatives May Not Be Good
Investments for Banks Acting as Fiduciaries, OCC Says, 66
Banking Rep. (BNA) 765 (May 6, 1996) [hereinafter
Derivatives May Not] (reporting that the OCC warned
national banks that derivatives may not be acceptable for
banks acting as fiduciaries)
.
255 See id
256 See OCC Plans Additional Guidance on Banks' Use of
Financial Derivatives, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA) 627 (Apr. 15,
1996) (citing remarks by two OCC officials at the April
10, 1996 EUDA meeting in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
OCC Plans]
.
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underlying risk exposure of financial institutions
.
2:> The
OCC focuses on three areas of concern: risk management,
information reporting, and capital adequacy, all of which
are interrelated and must be viewed as a whole. 25i The OCC
requires national banks to address the categories of
risk 25 when evaluating derivative investments for others,
just as they require for the bank's own investments. 260
Furthermore, the OCC suggests that a review of account
investment objectives, portfolio size, investment horizon,
principal and income distribution, liquidity needs, tax
consequences, and overall risk profiles are necessary to
determine the appropriateness of a particular investment
for a fiduciary account. 261 "If a dealer bank makes a
257 See id.
258 c~~ -; ^iSee id.
See Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency,
Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services (Mar. 13, 1996), in O.C.C. News Release
96-32, Mar. 13, 1996, app. at 1.
260 See Derivatives May Not, supra note 254, at 765; see
also O.C.C. Bulletin 96-25, supra note 254, at 71,743
(stating that the OCC considers it an unsafe and unsound
practice to purchase derivative instruments in a fiduciary
capacity without a full appreciation of all involved
risks)
.
261 See OCC Bulletin 96-25, supra note 254, at 71,744; OCC
Plans, supra note 255, at 627
: : 5
determination that a particular transaction is
inappropriate for its customer, it should bring that
assessment to the customer's attention."^ 6" Also, if the
customer insists on proceeding with the transaction, the
bank should make sure it has documented its assessment and
the information given to the customer, thereby protecting
the bank from greater litigation and reputation risks. ~ c
E. The Federal Reserve
The central bank generally has two possible regulatory
options: (1) pursuing a "command and control" regulatory
strategy where the Fed simply states what a regulated
entity can and cannot do; or (2) pursuing an "incentive-
compatible" approach, where regulations are aligned with
incentives to achieve certain social and regulatory
goals. 264 Regarding derivatives regulation, the Fed has
262 OCC Plans, supra note 72, at 627 (quoting Douglas E.
Harris, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Capital Markets,
before the guidelines were actually handed down)
.
263 See id.
264 See Greenspan Calls for Greater Focus on Disclosing
Risk Measures for Deals, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA) 352 (Mar.
4, 1996) (quoting Chairman Greenspan's statements from the
February 23, 1996 Financial Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta in Coral Gables, Florida)
.
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mixed these two approaches. In the 1990s, it became
obvious that minimum capital requirements would have to be
established against bank market risk, due to the increased
risk of loss. 265 The Fed.'s "standardized approach"
divided trading-book assets into different risk categories
and then assessed a capital charge against each
category. 266 This approach has generated a negative
reaction by the banking industry, so the Fed established
capital regulation under the "internal models approach."" 6
Under this concept, banks use their own internal risk-
assessment models to assess their market risk and then
report this value to their regulator for use in
establishing capital requirements. 268
The Fed.'s newest "pre-commitment approach" to
regulation forces banks to state the maximum loss that its
trading portfolio would sustain over a specific period of
time. 26 " Under this approach, a bank pre-commits to a
maximum loss level and "their capital charge for market
265 See id.
266 See id
267 See id
268 See id
269 See id.
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risk equals their pre-committed maximum loss level. If the
bank's losses exceed this level, a significant penalty is
imposed. ,,27 °
The pre-commitment approach carries three advantages:
(1) banks can choose to control risk through higher
capital levels or by use of sophisticated dynamic hedging
strategies; (2) it gives banks an incentive to use and
develop the most sophisticated methods for assessing
portfolio risk; and (3) the approach saves regulators from
imposing some type of basic "one-size-fits
.
2l1
270 See id
271 See id,
CONCLUSION
Derivatives can create stability in their user's income
with respect to volatility in foreign exchange rates,
interest rates, and commodity prices. These contracts,
which allow businesses with offsetting risks to contract
with each other in order to minimize those risks, are a
wonderful way to create efficiencies in an inefficient
market. However, this risk shifting instruments can become
very complex and if not understood and managed properly
could lead to big losses, like the ones illustrated in
chapter III.
Again, if the derivative is to have value, the costs of
finding an appropriate counterparty (or the fees paid to a
broker) cannot exceed the potential savings or gains from
the derivative. The costs of entering into derivative
contracts will undoubtedly go up if parties to the
contracts are forced to comply with excessive federal
regulations. The regulations that are imposed by the SEC
and the other authorities enumerated in Chapter IV arevery
108
109
well measured and balanced and would not increase the
operating cost of these instruments. At the same time
would make the derivative transactions more transparent.
Derivative instruments, in the form of options and
forwards, have been around since the middle ages. Banks
and other financial institutions experienced insolvency
and other crises before that. Earlier still, people were
defrauding other people out of their money. Looking at the
problems, however, one thing should be clear the
instruments are complex and the problems are basic. In
short, there will always be a few people who misuse tools
that are useful to the rest of society.
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